

Source Notes

The principal sources for this book are my intensive interviews, spanning three years, of the people profiled. While I have corroborated their accounts as much as possible with interviews of other radicals, government officials, family members, friends, media reports, and official government documents, it is their stories I tell. And while my extensive fact-checking was necessary, I felt that to footnote the individual stories would detract, not add to, their integrity. For the Saudi individuals profiled, I also corroborated—or discounted—important facts in their stories with the psychiatrist and psychologists who treated two of the individuals, and for all of the Saudis, senior officials from the Saudi Ministry of Interior. For the Pakistani accounts, I received on background invaluable corroboration from three outstanding Pakistani journalists and a high-ranking senior American intelligence official who oversees Pakistan in his portfolio. While he must remain nameless, I cannot thank him enough for verifying some of the most important points in the Pakistani stories.

I also bring to this book five years of original research, more than a hundred other interviews and extensive academic reading. So, rather than footnotes or endnotes, I have collected here some of my recommendations for further reading, for those who wish to follow up on individual points raised in the book. I have divided my suggestions by chapter for convenience only. There is obviously much overlap between chapters.

In 2004, I founded a non-profit research institute with the goal of acquiring original data on why people support or oppose extremism. The result has been more than thirty public opinion surveys throughout the Muslim world. The extensive results of our research can be found at www.terrorfreetomorrow.org. The broader

conclusions I have learned from nationwide public opinion research throughout the Muslim world necessarily informs the more specific findings on individuals in this book. Public opinion research, though, can only take us so far. As Dr. Jerrold Post, a foremost psychiatrist on terrorists, concludes, “If one really wants to understand ‘what makes terrorists tick,’ the best way is to ask them.” See Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda*, New York: Palgrave, 2007, at p. 9. Similarly, noted terrorism analyst Marc Sageman insightfully tells us that the deeds of terrorists are “so horrific that they are no longer considered human and what we know about humans no longer applies to them. But they are human.” See Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008 at 61.

There are other academic studies examining the factors that have helped create radical Islamist militants. As Jessica Stern concludes: “In real life (as opposed to elegant, parsimonious theory), people have mixed motives for everything they do.” Jessica Stern, *In the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, New York: Harper Collins, 2003. (p. 5). Stern’s work identifies the range of political, religious, social and personal factors that may cause “one person to become a terrorist [and] another to become a saint.” (p. 283). The accepted consensus among scholars is that for terrorists and extremists in general, “their primary shared characteristic is their normalcy, insofar as we understand that term. Psychological studies of terrorists are virtually unanimous on this point.” (Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, New York: Random House, 2006 at 15; See also Jerrold Post at 4-5.) Indeed, Richardson and Stern identify the altruistic motives of many radicals, as well as their desire for glory and recognition, and to redress the humiliation “they perceive themselves as

having suffered.” (Richardson at 94). Some get involved “out of a desire for adventure. Many join out of friendship or through social networks.” (Stern at 4-5). In another context, Thomas Hegghammer cogently analyzes the often-overlooked motive of nationalistic, pan-Islamic solidarity. (See Thomas Hegghammer, “ Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment,” *Cultures & Conflicts*, June 12, 2008.) Marc Sageman’s seminal research has enlightened us particularly on the importance of group dynamics and the crucial role of social networks in amplifying individual moral outrage. (See *Leaderless Jihad* and Marc Sageman’s earlier study, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). As Sageman elucidates in *Leaderless Jihad*, radicalization often begins “with a strong sense of moral outrage..., which resonates with their own life experiences.”(p.57) These individuals then connected with others in a network which “educated them in an ideology that framed their moral outrage with their personal life.” (*Id.*) Joining this “social movement was based to a great degree on friendship and kinship.” (p.68) Sageman describes the intense group dynamics as completely transforming the participants “in a process of in-group love.” (p.86) They become “warriors in pursuit of fame and glory,” (p.80) “heroes,” (p. 159), indeed even “rock stars” (p.81) within their environment. As Sageman concludes, these “generally idealistic young people seeking ...glory fighting for justice...are essentially romantic men and women chasing a dream.” (pp 35, 33)

The individuals presented in this book corroborate to varying degrees the best of the academic research outlined above. What this book’s profiles add to the academic literature—in addition to emphasizing human complexity and “mixed motives”—is the importance of understanding the unique culture, religious beliefs,

and perspective of the militants and jihadis themselves. They may be chasing a dream, but it is a very particular kind of dream, within a particular religious and cultural context.

There have also been a great deal of studies about the history and impact of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Islamist radicals, Jihadi militants, and current changes in the Middle East and Pakistan/Afghanistan. The select few, which comprise the very best, and which I can highly recommend, are:

1. Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002 and *The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader*, New York: Free Press, 2006;
2. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2004 and *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008
3. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Towers: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, New York: Random House, 2006; and
4. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001 and *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, New York: Viking Penguin, 2008.

It is important to remember throughout my book, as I state in the introduction, the interpretations of Islam, which motivate the jihadis profiled, do not necessarily represent Islam or Muslims as a whole. This book is about jihadis—in particular those featured—and not about Islam or Muslims in general.

Chapter One

As Bruce Riedel, former CIA veteran, senior White House adviser on Middle East and South Asian issues and chair of President Obama's strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan, writes:

“If Pakistan is the most important and difficult nation to deal with in order to destroy al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia is probably second on the list.” See Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, at p. 146.

For more background on the history, economy and importance of Saudi Arabia, see the following:

1. Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008;
2. Mark Weston, *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008;
3. Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002 and *The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader*, New York: Free Press, 2006;
4. Robert Lacey, *Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia*, New York: Viking, 2009;
5. Reza Aslan, *No God but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam*, New York: Random House, 2005;
6. Zahir Othman, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Al-Turath, 2006;

7. Ministry of Information and Culture, *Saudi Arabia: Views from the Kingdom*, Riyadh: Ministry of Information and Culture, 2006;
8. John R. Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed*, New York: Palgrave, 2005;
9. Tim Niblock, *The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Routledge, 2007;
10. Mawdawi Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007;
11. Natana J. DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004;
12. Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban, *Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State*, Boulder: Rienner, 2009;
13. Mohammad Al-Bisher, editor, *Saudis and Terror*, Riyadh: Ghainaa, 2005;
14. Mawdawi Al-Rasheed, editor, *Kingdom without Borders*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008;
15. Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, New York: New York University Press, 2000; and
16. Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca*, New York: Doubleday, 2007;
17. As'ad Abu Khalil, *The Battle for Saudi Arabia*, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004;
18. William Simpson, *The Prince*, New York: Harper, 2007;
19. Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud Inside the Kingdom*, New York: 1997.
20. Bernard Haykel, "How Stable is Saudi Arabia: What Makes the Kingdom Different", *The New York Times*, March 14, 2011, and at nytimes.com

<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/14/how-stable-is-saudi-arabia/what-makes-the-kingdom-different> (accessed March, 15, 2011)

News articles on Terror Free Tomorrow's research in Saudi Arabia, including a front-page story from the leading reform newspaper, *Al Watan* article, can be accessed at:

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/CSM_CNN_WashPost_NYTimes_pdf.pdf

Interviews of Ahmad Al Shayea and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008, and throughout 2009 to 2011 in Saudi Arabia.

For the conservative background and culture of Buraydah, see Edward Pilkington, "Like Dallas Policed by the Taliban," *The Guardian*, July 2, 2002.

An overview of the importance of dates is provided by Eric Hansen in "Looking for the Khalasah," *Saudi Aramco World*, July/August 2004, at 2-15. See also www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200404/looking.for.the.khalasah.htm.

Virginia Danielson, *The Voice of Egypt*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997 is a full account of the music and influence of Umm Kalsoum. The 1979 attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca is expertly reported in full by Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca*, New York: Doubleday, 2007.

A brief overview of the usage, history, custom and benefits of the chewing and use of *miswak* is provided by Iman Sherif, Staff Writer at *Gulf News*, in "Miswak—the wonder twig", and can be accessed at

<http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/miswak-the-wonder-twig-1.854099>.

According to *Gulf News*, the *miswak* is a twig taken from the *Salvadora Persica*

referred to as *arak*, and is said to have originated 7,000 years ago by the Pharaohs in Egypt. *Miswak* is chewed by many individuals throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and is not necessarily confined to jihadis (nor uniformly practiced by all jihadis).

For the social and dating practices of young Saudis, see Katherine Zoepf, “Love on the Girls’ Side of the Saudi Divide, *New York Times*, May 13, 2008 and Katherine Zoepf, “Out with the Boys for a Night of Numbering,” *New York Times*, May 13, 2008. For the sub-culture of young Saudi men regarding cars and racing, see Robert F. Worth, “Saudis Race All Night, Fueled by Boredom,” *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.

The Tribal custom of marrying a relative that I allude to in Ahmad’s household is a practice that is limited by the *Shari’ah* and the Qur’an. Followers of Islam are forbidden from marrying his or her issue, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews, but are allowed to marry cousins, including first cousins.

Unemployment among Saudi youth over the past decade has been conservatively estimated at about one-third. (“Almost 75 percent of Saudi citizens are under age 30 and youth unemployment is approaching 30 percent—a potential breeding ground for terrorists.”) See Dana Moss and Zvika Krieger, “A Tipping Point in Saudi Arabia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 15, 2007; Karen Elliott House, “The Saudi Cabinet Shake-Up Portends Real Reform,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 23, 2009 and Kevin R. Taecker, “Myths and Realities about Unemployment in Saudi Arabia,” *Saudi-American Forum*, SAF Essay #11, March 30, 2003.

Over the course of 2008 through 2011, I conducted more than forty-three interviews of young Saudi jihadis. I also conducted interviews of seventeen different Saudi Ministry of Interior and other government officials, both at the supervisory level and those with direct responsibility for monitoring and/or rehabilitating known jihadi militants. I found that the motivations for Saudis leaving to fight in Iraq or otherwise to become jihadis are as varied as the individuals involved. A senior American intelligence official, who I interviewed in March and April 2009, made an important overarching point to me. This high-level official told me that: “For the vast majority of Islamic jihadis, if they had grown up in Iowa instead of the Middle East, they would’ve had joined the Marine Corps instead.”

In this respect, as well as others, Ahmad Al-Shayea is representative of the overwhelming majority of Saudi jihadis, particularly those who went to Iraq to fight. First, among Saudis, there is a strong feeling of pan-Islamic solidarity or Islamic nationalism, in addition to religious fervor. “Americans can’t imagine how a young man living a decent life in Riyadh could feel so much love and passion for a fellow Muslim and feel compelled to go and fight when he sees television footage of Iraqis or Afghans being killed and tortured. But that’s the result of strong Islamic blood ties.” Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Iraq: Spinning Off Arab Terrorists?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 8, 2005. See also Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home,” *New York Times*, April 23, 2004. Second, numerous accounts, like Al-Shayea, portray an apparently sincere and altruistic motive to help those who are suffering—in particular, motivated by the torture at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. According to the senior U.S. military interrogator responsible for the capture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, “the number one

reason foreign fighters flocked [to Iraq] to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.” Matthew Alexander, “I’m Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq,” *Washington Post*, November 30, 2008. See also Katherine Zoepf, “Deprogramming Jihadists,” *New York Times*, November 9, 2008 and Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “Seeking Salvation in City of Insurgents,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 2004. Third, a powerful religious fervor and belief in martyrdom should be fully acknowledged. See Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “In Hideout, Foreign Arab Share Vision of Martyrdom,” *Washington Post*, November 9, 2004; Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Iraq: Spinning Off Arab Terrorists?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 8, 2005 and Susan B. Glasser, “Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudi,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005. Finally, a composite of other motivations, including social networks (friends, relatives, a sense of “Jihadi cool”), lack of professional fulfillment and psychological and personal reasons all also play a role to varying degrees. See Jason Burke, “What Turns Individuals into Radicals,” *The Guardian*, May 7, 2008 (“Research by agencies in the West and the Middle East has revealed the enormous range of factors involved – from a distant relationship with a father to a failure to find a job that matches often relatively high educational achievement, from a predisposition to violence to search for company and belonging. Research has also focused on the impact of exposure to images of conflict in the Muslim world via TV and the internet, and on the crucial role that group dynamics can play in reinforcing extremism.”)

The consensus view has been that the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq came from Saudi Arabia (Susan B. Glasser, “Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudi,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005), with estimates ranging from half to over 70 percent. Further, “American commanders say that foreigners make up more than 90

percent of the suicide bombers.” Dexter Filkins, “Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2005.

As with Al-Shayea, the customary pathway for Saudi jihadis to enter Iraq during 2004 and 2005 was through Syria. “The foreign fighters are generally thought to enter Iraq from Syria, where they move through the cities and towns along the Euphrates River toward Baghdad.” Dexter Filkins, “Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2005. The foreign fighters also generally joined Zarqawi’s group, first called “Tawhid and Jihad,” and from the middle of October 2004, “Al Qaeda in Iraq” or “Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia,” after Zarqawi pledged loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. See Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,” *Washington Post*, June 8, 2005; Walter Pincus, “Zarqawi is Said to Swear Allegiance to Bin Laden,” *Washington Post*, October 19, 2004 and Staff Report, “Profile: Tawhid and Jihad Group,” *BBC News*, October 8, 2004.

For general background on fighting in Iraq and the Iraq war, the following books are recommended:

1. Dexter Filkins, *The Forever War*, New York: Knopf, 2008;
2. George Packer, *The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006;
3. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, New York: Penguin Books, 2007;
4. Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, New York: Harper Collins, 2004; and
5. David Finkel, *The Good Soldiers*, New York: FSG, 2009.

The report quoted is from CNN News on December 24, 2004. See Staff Report, “Police: Baghdad Fuel Truck Blast a Suicide Attack,” *CNN*, December 24, 2004.

There are three major and distinct news reports about Ahmad Al-Shayea. The first was by USA TODAY about a month after the bombing, which is based entirely on a videotape of a statement made by Ahmad to Iraqi officials and released to USA TODAY by the Iraqi Interior Ministry. (See Stephen Komarow and Sabah al-Anbaki, “Would-be Suicide Bomber Angry at Those who Sent Him,” *USA TODAY*, January 24, 2005.) The second report is by CNN’s Nic Robertson, broadcast on September 14, 2007, comprising an interview of less than a minute with Ahmad, along with the slightly longer accompanying article on CNN.com. See Nic Robertson, “Failed Suicide Bomber Turns on Al Qaeda,” *CNN*, September 14, 2007 and at CNN. com <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/0914/reformed.jihadist/index.html> (Accessed August 6, 2008). The final is an Associated Press article, widely circulated, based on a two-hour interview of Ahmad in a Riyadh hotel room in July 2007 by AP reporter Donna Abu-Nasr. See Donna Abu-Nasr, “Truck Bomber Turns Against Jihad,” MSNBC, July 29, 2007; Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Turns his Back on Jihad,” *USA TODAY*, July 28, 2007. I conducted over 20 hours of interviews with Ahmad, as well as an active correspondence, over the course of summer of 2008 and again during the winter and spring of 2009, as well as throughout 2010 and later. In substance, all of the reports corroborate the main features of Ahmad’s account. The important facts are in accord. There are, however, some minor discrepancies among the three reports, and in addition, between the reports and what Ahmad told me in far more detailed and lengthier interviews. For example, Nic Robertson reports that 12 people died in the attacks; yet CNN at the time reported eight fatalities. CNN also

quotes Ahmad as stating that he never intended to be a suicide bomber, but was “tricked” by Al Qaeda. There are not many other details in the short CNN piece. The initial USA TODAY report of 2005, based on the Iraqi videotape, has Ahmad stating he left for Syria and Iraq *after* Ramadan; was brought across to Iraq by a Syrian smuggler; traveled to Ramadi in Iraq with many other foreign fighters of varying nationalities and finally, that Ahmad intended to be a suicide bomber in Iraq, just not on the specific mission during which he was actually injured. The AP report has Ahmad leaving for Syria *before* the end of Ramadan; brought across to Iraq by “four Iraqi teenagers”; taken to Ramadi with just one other Saudi fighter; nine people dying in the attack and most importantly, that Ahmad never intended to be a suicide bomber in Iraq, just a jihadi fighter. I went over all of these facts and many others in detail with Ahmad and several Saudi Ministry of Interior officials who were familiar with the facts of Ahmad’s case, as well as with the Saudi psychologist who treated Ahmad. Ahmad and my sources, along with both the CNN interview and the AP report, confirm that Ahmad never went to Iraq intending to be a suicide bomber, as is reported in USA TODAY. The fact that Ahmad was never told he was sent on a suicide mission was a common practice among Zarqawi’s fighters at that time. See Tom Downey, “The Insurgent’s Tale,” *Rolling Stone*, December 15, 2005. Ahmad, my sources and AP also confirm that Ahmad left Saudi Arabia *during* Ramadan 2004 and not after, as USA TODAY reports. And at odds with USA TODAY, AP and my interview and sources confirm that Ahmad traveled to Ramadi with just one Saudi fighter, not “many foreign fighters.” Lastly, AP’s report that Ahmad crossed into Iraq from Syria with the help of “four Iraqi teenagers” is not confirmed by Ahmad and my sources, or the USA TODAY piece, all of which has Ahmad crossing the Syrian-Iraqi

border with the assistance of a Syrian smuggler by the alias of “Abu Mohammed,” which makes more sense than “four Iraqi teenagers” leading the would-be fighters across the Syrian and Iraqi borders. Other accounts of how fighters were transported from Syria into Iraq during 2004 and early 2005 reference Syrian smugglers as responsible for the border crossings. See Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,” *Washington Post*, June 8, 2005.

Chapter Two

Interviews of Abby, his colleagues, and his counseling Saudi psychologist occurred over the summer of 2008, and the winter, spring and summer of 2009 in Saudi Arabia, and additional follow in 2009, 2010 and 2011.

For the Holy Qur’an on honey see (16:69). The best of numerous translations of the Qur’an consulted include:

1. N.J. Dawood, trans., *The Koran*, London: Penguin, 2006
2. Majid Fakhry, trans., *The Qur’an*, Reading, UK: Garnet, 2005
3. Laleh Bakhtiar, trans., *The Sublime Quran*, Chicago: Kazi, 2009
4. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans., *The Holy Qur’an*, Beltsville, Md: Amana, 1989
5. Muhammad Asad, trans., *The Message of the Qur’an*, Bristol, UK: Book Foundation, 2003
6. Arthur J. Arberry, trans., *The Koran Interpreted*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2008;
7. Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, trans., *The Glorious Qur’an*, New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 2006;
8. M.H. Shakir, trans., *The Qur’an*, New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 2004;

9. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans., *The Qur'an*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.

For more on the Zamzam well and water, see "Zamzam Studies and Research Centre" *Saudi Geological Survey*. <http://www.sgs.org.sa/index.cfm?sec=311&page=>.

(Accessed on February 14, 2009); Shil, Mahmud Isma`il and `Abdul-Wahid, `Abdur-Rahman. "[The Well of Zam zam](#)". *IslamOnline*.

<http://www.islamonline.net/English/hajj/Landmarks/1425/08.shtml>. (Accessed on February 14, 2009). See also Careem, S. H. A. "The Miracle of Zamzam," *Sunday Observer*, January 30, 2005

<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2005/01/30/fea36.html> and "The Hajj in Perspective: A Conversation with David Long," Saudi-US Relations Information Service, December 2, 2008 <http://www.saudi-us-realtions.org/articles/2008/interviews/081202-long-hajj.html>

For more information regarding the usage, sale, trade, and development of bees and honey in Saudi Arabia, see Shahid Ali Khan, "The Kingdom Aims to Increase and Develop Beekeeping," *Saudi Beekeeping Industry*, September 2007

http://www.saudibi.com/?page_id=92 (Accessed on June 18, 2011) ; see also "Saudis Demand Protection of Native Bees", *Emirates 24/7*, February 14, 2011 <http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/saudis-demand-protection-of-native-bees-2011-02-14-1.355917> (Accessed on June 18, 2011)

Al Taif al-Ma'nous, or "Taif the Friendly," is a city an hour West from Mecca, and is known for its stunning agricultural landscape, exotic fruits, and greenery. For more information, see Omar Al-Mudhwahi, "The Scent of Taif", *Asharq al-Awsat*, May 16 2006 <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=4960> (Accessed on

May 6, 2010); Michael R. Hayward, “The Roses of Taif”, *Saudi Aramco World*, August 2004 <http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200408/the.roses.of.taif-.compilation..htm> (Accessed on June 16, 2011) and Staff Report, *The Saudi Gazette* (June 18, 2011).

Abby’s favorite *ayah* (or verse) in the Holy Qur’an is *ayah* 56 in Surah Ya-Sin.

On the predominance of religious subjects in Saudi public schools, see Mark Weston, *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008 at 410; Hamad I. Al Salloom, *Education in Saudi Arabia*, Beltsville, MD: Amana, 1995 and Zahir Othman, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Al-Turath, 2006.

On the relatively more liberal culture of the Hijaz and Taif, see John R. Bradley, “Are the Saudis Sunk?” *Prospect Magazine*, September 2003. See also John R. Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis*, New York: Palgrave, 2005 and Damien McElroy, “Baboons Ransack Saudi Arabian Towns,” *Telegraph*, April 9, 2008.

On the role of women, “marriage guardians,” dowries and forced marriages in Saudi Arabia, see John R. Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed*, Id., David E. Long, *Culture and Customs in Saudi Arabia*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005; Staff Report, “Saudi Arabia Bans Forced Marriages,” *BBC News*, April 12, 2005; Staff Report, “Women Speak Out In Saudi Arabia,” *CBS News*, March 24, 2005 and Human Rights Watch, *Perpetual Minors: Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia*, April 2008, accessed on February 17, 2009 at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/04/19/perpetual-minors-o>

See also Rajaa Alsanea, *Girls of Riyadh*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2007.

As with Ahmad in Chapter One, the story of Abby and his girlfriend Maryam are additional portraits of a jihadi as a young man (and in this case, woman). The motives behind any individual jihadi are as complex, hidden and varied as the diverse human beings who are attracted to radicalism. In fact, discerning true human motivations is a perilous and often tenuous task in any sphere. Yet with jihadis, it is a mission that we must embark on, or be doomed to failure in our response. There are numerous reasons—known or unconscious— that motivate jihadis to act. The first point is often overlooked. Even the best among the limited empirical research available focuses on the *conscious* motivations that jihadis overtly express, or those apparent factors that can be discerned from their outward circumstances. As this chapter (and indeed this entire book) makes clear, however, the psychological, unconscious propellers of human action are every bit as important to determining who may become radicalized. For example, Marc Sageman, who has conducted perhaps the most extensive studies (see both his excellent *Terror Networks* and his even better *Leaderless Jihad*), rightly concludes that jihadis are “generally idealistic young people [and] essentially romantic men and women chasing a dream.” (*Leaderless Jihad*, pp. 33-35). However, that “dream” can only be understood in its own very particular cultural context. The idealistic and romantic nature of Abby and Maryam is very much rooted to a specific and discrete Saudi Muslim culture. By way of comparison to Afghan culture in this regard, see Jack Healy, “In Afghanistan, Rage at Young Lovers,” *The New York Times*, July 30, 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/world/asia/31herat.html?pagewanted=all> (Accessed on July 31, 2011) Without understanding that culture, more generic

academic studies of the causes of radicalization fall wide of the mark. Of course, since that culture varies from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, general conclusions involving other young jihadis should only be drawn with caution. Indeed, this book shows the importance of culture to understanding individual radicalization, and presents the case for a broader cultural and religious understanding behind particular actors.

“The foreign fighters are generally thought to enter Iraq from Syria, where they move through the cities and towns along the Euphrates River toward Baghdad.” Dexter Filkins, “Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2005; Susan B. Glasser, “Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudi,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005. See also Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,” *Washington Post*, June 8, 2005.

Spousal abuse in Saudi Arabia is documented by Charlene Gubash, “Saudis Confront Wife Abuse,” *NBC News*, April 27, 2004 (one study reporting that up to three quarters of Saudi woman experienced some kind of abuse in their marriages); Najah Alosaimi, “Outlaw Marital Abuse, Demand Saudi Women,” *Arab News*, April 10, 2007; Staff Report, “Beaten Saudi Women Speak Out,” *BBC News*, April 30, 2004. See also Katherine Zoepf, “Saudi Women Find an Unlikely Role Model: Oprah,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2008.

There are more than 1.5 million women domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, with about half from Indonesia. The Saudi Labor Law excludes all domestic workers from any protections, and their abuse inside the Kingdom is endemic. See Faiza Saleh Ambah, “A Critical View of Saudis’ Treatment of Foreign Help,” *Washington Post*, December 7, 2008 and Human Rights Watch, “As If I Am Not Human: Abuses

against Asian Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia,” July 2008 (accessed on February 21, 2009 at:

<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/07/if-i-am-not-human-o>)

The role of the Internet and chat rooms in particular to Jihadi radicalization is examined in Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* at 112-16. (“Major developments...are expanding the role of women in the movement...They are more active in chat rooms....sharing their hopes and dreams with their virtual friends on these radical forums.”). See also Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment,” *Cultures & Conflicts*, June 12, 2008 (“The Internet has no doubt played a major role in the self-radicalization of many young Saudis. The Internet has also facilitated communications between interested recruits and so-called gatekeepers who can give practical advice on how to get to Iraq. Written instructions on how to join the Iraq jihad have also circulated online.”) The increasing role of women in the Iraqi jihad has been reported by Sudarsan Raghavan, “Female Suicide Bombers are Latest War Tactic,” *Washington Post*, September 17, 2008 and Tom A. Peter, “Daughters of Iraq,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 11, 2008.

Chapter Three

Interviews of Malik and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008 in Pakistan, with follow up throughout 2009, 2010 and 2011.

As Nicholas Kristof, the outstanding *New York Times* columnist wrote: “Barack Obama’s most difficult international test...will very likely be here in Pakistan. A country with 170 million people and up to 60 nuclear weapons may be

collapsing.” Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Pakistan Test,” *New York Times*, November 23, 2008.

For background on Afghanistan/Pakistan and relevant statistics, see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedermann, “Obama’s War,” *Washington Post*, February 15, 2009. Also at

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/obamas_war_10845

For background information on the Taliban, its ideology, behavior, and comparison with al- Qaeda, before, during, and after the death of Osama Bin Laden, see:

1. Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, *supra*.
2. Rashid, *Taliban*, and *Descent into Chaos*, *supra*.
3. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, editors, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 2008.
4. Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, Princeton University Press, 2010.
5. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.
6. Christina Lamb, *The Sewing Circles of Herat: A Personal Voyage Through Afghanistan*, Harper Collins, 2002.
7. Ali H. Soufan, *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011.

8. Deb Riechmann, “Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda May Rethink Ties Now that Osama Bin Laden is Dead, Says Analysts”, *The Huffington Post*,

May 04, 2011 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/05/afghan-taliban-al-qaeda-may-rethink-ties_n_857876.html

“Pakistan is the only nuclear state with a powerful militant insurgency in its midst, one that clearly has aims to take over the country, and desperately wants to acquire the Bomb. It does not help matters that the government has veered between a dictatorship that has supported both the United States and the Taliban and a newly elected democratic leadership known chiefly for corruption and ineptitude.” David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, New York: Harmony Books, 2009 at 176-77; See also the *Washington Post*’s insightful David Ignatius: “Of all the problems confronting the Obama administration, none is trickier than Pakistan – a nuclear power that has a war in Afghanistan on its western border, a tense confrontation with India on its eastern border and deadly insurgency at home from Muslim militants who want to topple the pro-American government.” David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Problem,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2009; Bruce Riedel, former CIA veteran, senior White House adviser on Middle East and South Asian issues and chair of President Obama’s strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan: “Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today, where every nightmare of the twenty-century—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the danger of nuclear war, dictatorship, poverty, and drugs—come together in one place.” Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, at 13.

For background on Terror Free Tomorrow's extensive work in Pakistan, see <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5>. *The Daily Times* article on the importance of our polling can be accessed in full at: <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/March%2017%20Daily%20Times.pdf>

According to the *Washington Post*, the American official who monitors Pakistan most closely over the past six years has been Admiral Mike Mullen, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I've tried ...really hard to understand Pakistan over the last year-plus, and it's much more opaque than it is transparent," Mullen explained. See David Ignatius, "The Pakistan Problem," *Washington Post*, January 30, 2009.

My interviews with the senior American intelligence official, who spoke on background, occurred primarily over March and April 2009, with additional subsequent follow-up throughout 2010 and 2011.

For news accounts of the Marriott terrorist attack and the claim of responsibility by the *Fidayeen-e-Islam*, see Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Islamabad's 'Message from Hell,'" *BBC News*, September 20, 2008; Staff Report, "Dozens Killed in Pakistan Attack," *BBC News*, September 20, 2008; Nic Robertson and Zain Verjee, "Deadly Blast Targets Marriott Hotel in Islamabad," *CNN*, September 21, 2008; Zein Basravi and Reza Sayah, "Official: Hotel Blast 'biggest attack' in 7 years for Pakistan," *CNN*, September 21, 2008; Carlotta Gall, "Bombing at Hotel in Pakistan Kills at Least 40," *New York Times*, September 21, 2008; Omar Waraich, "Blast Leaves Pakistan Shaken," *Time*, September 21, 2008; Staff Report, "Militants Claim Marriott Attack," *BBC News*, September 22, 2008; Staff Report, "Fidayeen-e-

Islam' Claims Islamabad Bombing," *Daily Times*, September 23, 2008; Reuters Report, "Pakistani Spies Hear Al Qaeda Celebrating Blast," *New York Times*, September 23, 2008; Staff Report, "Pakistani Spies Hear Qaeda Celebrating Marriott Blast," *Daily Times*, September 24, 2008; Editorial, "Countering Al Qaeda's Ideology," *Daily Times*, September 24, 2008; Simon Robinson, "Islamabad After the Marriott Bombing," *Time*, October 2, 2008; and Dexter Filkins, "The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan," *The New York Times*, September 28, 2008.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the massacres in Laghman Province are set forth in detail in M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, at Chapter 7 (Beginning of the Countrywide Armed Clashes) and Chapter 13 (Genocide throughout the Country).

Barakai was one of the largest UN refugee camps. UNHCR, *Registration of Afghans in Pakistan Oct 15, 2006 - Feb 15, 2007: Top 26 Camps*, August 5, 2007. See also Staff Report, "84 Percent of Afghans Don't Plan to Return Home," *Daily Times*, May 4, 2007; Staff Report, "Government Decides Operation in Camps," *The News*, May 4, 2007. The conditions in the Afghan UN refugee camps in Pakistan are described in Masood Farivar, *Confessions of a Mullah Warrior*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009 and the numerous UNHCR reports.

For the role of JUI and the madrassas in the UN refugee camps, see Rashid, *Taliban*, and *Descent into Chaos*. For the importance of these camps in the formation and support of the Taliban movement, see Daniel Del Castillo, "Pakistan's Islamic Colleges Provide the Taliban's Spiritual Fire," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 28, 2001. See also "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of

Words?” Asia Report No. 158—24 July 2008, *International Crisis Group*, at 3: “With the Pakistani military’s patronage and foreign funding, extremist madrasas in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt of Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) also mushroomed, becoming a source of recruitment and influence for the Afghan Mujahidin. As millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, refugee camps likewise became a source of support and recruitment for the Afghan Islamists....The distorted interpretations of Sunni Deobandism taught in these madrasas, superimposed on an equally distorted version of *Pashtunwali* were to form the Taliban creed. The Taliban foot soldiers (the talibs, students, from which the movement took its name) were mainly dispossessed, marginalized Pashtun youth, many from the Pakistani madrasas.”

Accounts of Mullah Omar and the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad have been reported on by Norimitsu Onishi, “A Nation Challenged: A Shrine; A Tale of the Mullah and Muhammad’s Amazing Cloak,” *New York Times*, December 19, 2001 and Graeme Wood, “Security Blanket: Afghanistan’s Most Venerable Relic Faces its Greatest Challenge,” *The Atlantic*, January/February 2009.

For the known (and quite limited) biographical background on Mullah Omar, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* at 288-89 and 549. (“He [Mullah Omar] believed in the prophecy of dreams and spoke about them in political and military meetings, drawing on them to explain important decisions.”). For more on the mystical inclinations and the central role of dreams for Mullah Omar, see Bergen *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* at 162-63; 315; 326; Robert Fisk, “Visions that Come to Men as They Sleep,” *The Independent*, January 26, 2008; Iain Edgar, at 68-69; Robert Marquand, “The Reclusive Ruler who Runs the Taliban,” *The Christian Science*

Monitor, October 10, 2001 (“Private visions [and dreams] are part of the decision making process that has guided the life of the man who rose from village mullah to Taliban leader.”); Juan R.I. Cole, “The Taliban, Women, and the Hegelian Private Sphere,” in Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, editors, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008 at 126-27; and Scott Shane, “A Dogged Taliban Chief Rebounds, Vexing U.S.,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2009.

The Taliban advance on Jalalabad, Nangarhar and Laghman is recounted in Rashid, *Taliban* at 47-48. See also John F. Burns, “Trucks of the Taliban,” *The New York Times*, November 23, 2001.

“Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan was an influential member of the Taliban Inner Shura.” See Ismail Khan, “Omar Called Washington to Seek Evidence against Osama,” *Dawn*, September 15, 2004. Mullah Ehsanullah was one of the most important Taliban leaders, before he was killed, to have contact with American officials. See Unclassified State Department cables (released by the National Security Archives). See also Rashid, *Taliban*, at 100-101.

Maulavi Qalamuddin was the first head of the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. See John F. Burns, “Sex and the Afghan Woman: Islam’s Straitjacket,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1997. See also Somini Sengupta, “Seeking Office by Shedding Taliban Past,” *New York Times*, September 17, 2005 and Rashid, *Taliban* at 105; Derek Henry Flood, “Vice, Virtue, and Vitriol: The Resurrection of Former Taliban Minister Maulvi Qalamuddin,” *Militant Leadership Monitor*, Volume II, Issue 6 (June 2011).

On the northern campaign in the spring of 1997 and the Taliban assault on Mazar, see Rashid, *Taliban* at 58-59. Additional information on the Religious Police is provided in Rashid, *Taliban* (Appendix 1) and Juan R.I. Cole, “The Taliban, Women, and the Hegelian Private Sphere,” in Robert D. Crews, at 134-37.

Al Qaeda’s camp in Jalalabad around the year 2000 is described in Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* at 167-68, and at 164 (Pashtun tribal code of honor). Al-Misri served as “general commander of all [Al Qaeda]’s camps.” Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* at 277. See also Mark Kukis, salon.com.

On the Taliban internal debate after 9/11 on whether to hand over bin Laden, see Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* at 163-66 and Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 249.

The re-grouping of the Taliban and reconstituting of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan from 2002 and subsequently is authoritatively described by Ahmad Rashid in *Descent into Chaos* at 242-246: “In the winter of 2002, Mullah Omar arrived in Quetta from Afghanistan. He was immediately accommodated by the ISI and stayed in safe houses run by the JUI Party, which now formed the provincial government in Quetta. Mullah Omar appointed four senior commanders to reorganize the fighters in the southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul. These were Mullah Barader Akhund, the former deputy defense minister; Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Usmani, former army chief; Mullah Dadullah, a famed one-legged corps commander; and the former interior minister Mullah Abdul Razzaq. All four men had close links to bin Laden and were known for their belief in global jihad....These exiled Taliban leaders received important support after the 2002 elections when the JUI Party came to power in the North-West Frontier and Balochistan provinces. The

JUI had helped launch the Taliban in 1994, and its madrassas in Pakistan had provided ideological training and refuge for scores of Taliban commanders. Several JUI mullahs who had fought with the Taliban in the 1990s were now elected members of the provincial assemblies in the two provinces..... Maulana Nur Mohammed, who ran the important Shaldara madrassa in Quetta, the first madrassa to send its students to fight for the Taliban in 1994, made it the major meeting place for Taliban commanders.” See also Staff Report, “Mullah Omar Gives Interview,” *BBC News*, May 17, 2002; and Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 325. The UN Consolidated List is an authoritative resource. United Nations, *The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them*, Version last updated on 03 October 2008.

Indeed, according to American military and intelligence officials: “From Quetta, Taliban leaders including Mullah Muhammad Omar, a reclusive, one-eyed cleric, guide the commanders in southern Afghanistan, raise money from wealthy Persian Gulf donors and deliver guns and fresh fighters to the battlefield, according to Obama administration and military officials....American intelligence officials said that the dozen or so militants who were thought to make up the Taliban leadership were believed to be hiding either in the sprawling Afghan refugee camps near Quetta or in some of the city’s Afghan neighborhoods.” Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears,” *New York Times*, February 10, 2009.

Mullah Dadullah joined the Taliban at the very beginning in 1994 and became a leading front-line commander after 2002. See Matthias Gebauer, “Taliban Leader Mullah Dadullah: The Star of Afghanistan’s Jihad,” *Der Spiegel*, March 1, 2007;

Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Taliban’s Most Feared Commander,” *BBC News*, May 13, 2007; Staff Report, “NATO: Taliban Mastermind Killed in Afghanistan,” *CNN*, May 13, 2007; Victor Korgun, “Afghanistan’s Resurgent Taliban,” *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 1, Issue 4, October 23, 2003 and Staff Report, “Taliban Military Commander Killed,” *Al Jazeera*, May 13, 2007.

Mullah Ubaidullah, Defense Minister for the Taliban government before 2001, beginning in 2002 was a top deputy to Mullah Omar in charge of organizing the insurgency in Afghanistan from Quetta. According to one report, Mullah Ubaidullah was “one of the insurgency’s leading strategists, playing an important role in rallying the scattered Taliban remnants to rebel against the Americans.” Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan – Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” Counter Terrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, *New America Foundation*, November 2010. During this period, Mullah Ubaidullah was one of only two deputies with direct access to Mullah Omar. See Carlotta Gall, “Top Taliban Leader is Arrested in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, March 1, 2007; UN 1267 Committee Consolidated List, *Id.*; Ismail Khan, “Mullah Omar’s Deputy Obaidullah Captured,” *Dawn*, March 2, 2007; Staff Report, “Taliban Leader Held in Pakistan,” *BBC News*, March 2, 2007; Simon Cameron-Moore, “Pakistan Braces for Taliban Backlash after Arrest,” *Reuters*, March 3, 2007. Mullah Baradar, beginning in 2002, was another top deputy to Mullah Omar and member of the “Quetta Shura,” reportedly rising to the second-in-command by 2008. See UN 1267 Committee Consolidated List, *Id.*; Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Taliban Two-Step: Can’t Sit Down Yet,” *Newsweek*, November 10, 2008 and “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” Asia Report No. 158–24, July 2008, *International Crisis Group*, International Crisis Group Report. By 2003,

the structure the Kandahar Taliban formed the “Quetta Shura”—a body consisting of the old-guard senior leadership, which had relocated to Quetta/Peshawar, tasked to closely direct strategy on the ground, facilitate the transfer of funds, recruit individuals to join their ranks, and implement propaganda campaigns. See Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan – Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar”, Counter Terrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, *New America Foundation*, November 2010. Mullah Usmani was for a time from 2002 onwards considered to be Mullah Omar’s second-in-command and potential successor, before he was killed by American forces in Helmand Province in December 2006. See Stephen Grey, “Key Taliban Leaders in Afghanistan Eliminated”, *ABC News*, July 24, 2008; Staff Report, “Top Taliban Leader Killed in U.S. Air Strike,” *The Hindu*, December 24, 2006; Staff Report, “Taleban Admit Commander’s Death,” *BBC News*, December 27, 2006; Jason Straziuso, “Killing of Taliban Leader Major Victory,” *Associated Press*, May 13, 2007.

The importance of dreams to political decision making by Mullah Omar was set forth above. Rahimullah Yusufzai, the Pashtun journalist and BBC correspondent, was one of the very few reporters to have ever interviewed Mullah Omar. According to Yusufzai: “No big military operation can happen unless he [Mullah Omar] gets his instructions in dreams; he was a big believer in dreams.” (Quoted in Iain Edgar, at 68.)

From 2002 through 2009 and thereafter, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, served as the headquarters for Mullah Omar and Taliban leaders to finance, organize and direct the Afghan insurgency, both in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. See Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in

Pakistani City Raises Fears,” *New York Times*, February 10, 2009; Laura King, “Taliban Leader’s Powerful Vanishing Act,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 5, 2007; and Declan Walsh, “Across the Border from Britain’s Troops, Taliban Rises Again,” *The Guardian*, May 27, 2006 and Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” *New York Times*, October 22, 2006.

For the overall views of ordinary Taliban fighters in late 2007 (and the only attempt to create more structured and representative survey), see Staff Report, “Talking to the Taliban,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 22-28, 2008.

An essential element to the renewed Taliban insurgency was the heroin trade. As one American officer summed up the traffic to the *New York Times*: “Drugs out [from Afghanistan] and guns in [from Pakistan]. Dexter Filkins, “Taliban Fill NATO’s Big Gaps in Afghan South,” *New York Times*, January 22, 2009. The Taliban have justified the heroin trade by virtue of the fact that their intended targets are infidel Westerners. See Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban*, pp. 118-121; Staff Report, “Talking to the Taliban,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 22-28, 2008.

Weapons, supplies, heroin and insurgents have freely crossed the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan from 2002 through 2008 and thereafter, with the direct collusion and assistance of the Pakistani Army and ISI, particularly at the border crossing into Southern Afghanistan at Chaman. See Declan Walsh, “Across the Border from Britain’s Troops, Taliban Rises Again,” *The Guardian*, May 27, 2006; Carlotta Gall, “At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge,” *New York Times*, January 21, 2007. In fact, General John Nicholson, the deputy commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan told the *New York Times* that between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “The borders are open.” Dexter Filkins of the *Times* reported:

“American commanders say the open borders allow the opium to move unimpeded into Pakistan and for the weapons and other supplies to flow in [to Afghanistan].”

Dexter Filkins, “Taliban Fill NATO’s Big Gaps in Afghan South,” *New York Times*, January 22, 2009. See also Muhammad Tahir, “Fueling the Taliban: Poppies, Guns and Insurgents,” *Terrorism Monitor*, July 10, 2008, and available at:

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5043&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1

According to Ahmed Rashid, American interceptions of wireless communications between Taliban commanders and Pakistan army officers at the border revealed that, “the Taliban would speak to officers at border checkpoints, asking for safe passage.” See Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 222-224. The cooperation between the ISI, Pakistani Army and the Taliban even grew so open that a Pakistani Army official even publicly declared some of the militant leaders as “patriots.” See Hamid Mir, “Army Official Calls Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah ‘Patriots’” *The News*, December 1, 2008.

An in-depth examination of the Taliban media team is provided by the International Crisis Group in “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” Asia Report No. 158—24, July 2008, *International Crisis Group*, International Crisis Group Report.

The arrest and confessions of “Dr. Hanif” is reported in full by Aryn Baker, “A Taliban Spokesman’s Confession,” *Time*, January 17, 2007.

Mullah Dadullah was killed by NATO forces in Afghanistan in early May 2007. Staff Report, “Afghan Taleban Commander Killed,” *BBC News*, May 13, 2007; Staff Report, “NATO: Taliban Mastermind Killed in Afghanistan,” *CNN*, May 13,

2007 and Staff Report, “Taliban Military Commander Killed,” *Al Jazeera*, May 13, 2007.

For the rise of the new Taliban in Pakistan during 2008, see Aryn Baker, “Pakistan: Negligent on Terror?” *Time*, June 30, 2008 and Pamela Constable, “A Modernized Taliban Thrives in Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, September 20, 2008. For those few Taliban who have joined the Karzai government, see Alissa J. Rubin, “Few Taliban Leaders Take Afghan Offer to Switch Sides,” *New York Times*, June 19, 2011.

Chapter Four

Interviews of Zeddy (Shaheed’s camp commander) and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008 in Pakistan, with follow up throughout 2009, 2010 and 2011.

The best recent reporting on the involvement of the Pakistani Army and its intelligence agency in supporting the Taliban and other Islamist radicals has come from outstanding work by the *New York Times* and by Dexter Filkins at *The New Yorker*. *See e.g.:*

1. Dexter Filkins, “Letter from Islamabad,” *The New Yorker*, September 19, 2011;
2. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Military Still Cultivates Militant Groups, a Former Fighter Says”, *The New York Times*, July 3, 2011, and at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html?page=wanted=all> (Accessed September 26, 2011)
3. Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” *The New York Times*, September 22, 2011.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?ref=asia>

4. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Tied to 2007 Border Ambush on Americans,” *The New York Times*, September 26, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/world/asia/pakistanis-tied-to-2007-attack-on-americans.html?_r=1&hp

See also:

5. Jane Perlez and Eric Schmidt, “Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of Journalist,” *New York Times*, July 4, 2011; Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Admiral Ties Pakistan to Killing of Journalist,” *New York Times*, July 7, 2011;
6. Declan Walsh, “Whose Side is Pakistan’s ISI Really On?” *The Guardian*, May 12, 2011
7. Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” *New York Times*, June 21, 2011;
8. Rowan Scarborough, “Pakistan Hesitates to Eradicate U.S.-mapped Militant Camps,” *The Washington Times*, July 11, 2011; and
9. Carlotta Gall, et.al., “Seized Phone Offers Clues to Bin Laden’s Pakistan Links,” *New York Times*, June 23, 2011.

On May 1, 2011, President Barak Obama announced that Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks on the United States, was killed in a firefight by U.S. forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. See Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says”, *New York Times*, May 1, 2011 and at nytimes.com <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin->

[laden-is-killed.html?pagewanted=all](#) (Accessed August 21, 2011). The death of Bin Laden marked what Obama referred to as the “most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al Qaeda.” *Id.* President Obama, however, went on to state that the death of Bin Laden “does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that Al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us.” For more information regarding the raid and killing of Osama Bin Laden, including the U.S., Pakistani, and global reaction, see:

1. Anjum Naveed, “Osama bin Laden Killed Near Pakistan’s West Point. Was he really hidden?”, *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 2, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0502/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-near-Pakistan-s-West-Point.-Was-he-really-hidden>
2. Tim Lister, “Abbottabad – The military town where bin Laden in plain sight”, *CNN.com*, May 2, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-02/world/bin.laden.abbottabad_1_al-qaeda-facilitator-ashfaq-parvez-kayani-north-waziristan?s=PM:WORLD
3. Farhan Bokhari & James Lamont, “Awkward questions loom for Pakistan”, *Financial Times*, May 2, 2011 and at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b25b6dee-74e4-11e0-a4b7-00144feabdco.html> (Accessed May 6, 2011)
4. Lawrence Wright, “The Double Game—The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan”, *The New Yorker*, May 16, 2011, and available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/16/110516fa_fact_wright (Accessed on May 9, 2011).
5. Kathy Gannon, “Accounts piece together bin Laden’s fugitive trail”, *Associated Press*, May 12, 2011,

- <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/accounts-piece-together-bin-ladens-fugitive-trail-o> (Accessed on May 13, 2011).
6. Graeme Smith, "Pakistan's reaction to Osama's Killing shows it's a country of contradictions", *Globe and Mail*, May 14, 2011, and at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pakistans-reaction-to-osamas-killing-shows-its-a-country-of-contradictions/article2021970/> (Accessed May 17, 2011)
 7. Chris Brummitt, "Accounts of militant training camp near bin Laden", *Associated Press*, May 22, 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/22/accounts-militant-training-camp-near-bin-laden>(Accessed on May 23, 2011).
 8. Akbar Ahmed, "The Code of the Hills," *Foreign Policy*, May 6, 2011, and available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/the_code_of_the_hills?page=0,1
 9. Karin Brulliard, "Pakistan's top military officials are worried about militant collaborators in their ranks", *The Washington Post*, May 27, 2011, and at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistani-military-worried-about-collaborators-in-its-ranks-officials-say/2011/05/27/AGgN10CH_story.html (Accessed May 28, 2011)
 10. Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, "Pakistan Arrests C.I.A. Informants in Bin Laden Raid," *The New York Times*, June 14, 2011, and available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15policy.html?pagewanted=all> (Accessed June 15, 2011)

11. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Military Still Cultivates Militant Groups, a Former Fighter Says”, *The New York Times*, July 3, 2011, and at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html?pagewanted=all> (Accessed July 4, 2011)

For background on Pakistan’s nuclear programs and their susceptibility to radical infiltration, see David Sanger, *The Inheritance*, at 206-32; Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, “Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance,” *The New York Times*, November 30, 2010,

Background on Burn Hall and similar elite private schools in Pakistan is described in Tariq Rahman, “English-Teaching Institutions in Pakistan,” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2001. See also: www.armyburnhall.bravehost.com

Maulana Maududi and his influence are analyzed in Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008 at 267-68 and at 280-81 and Philip Jenkins, “Clerical Terror,” *The New Republic*, December 24, 2008. The ethical and utopian writings of Maududi and the creation of the Jamaat are analyzed in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

The widespread campus violence and “Kalashnikov culture” of the student wing of Jamaat Islami during the late 1970’s and 1980’s is examined in Vali Nasr, at 68-70. See also Gilles Kepel, *Jihad The Trial of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003 at 104-105 and *Partisans of Allah* (“Armed with Mawdudi’s dictums in simple Urdu and the zeal of its student wing, the Jamiat-i-

Tulaba, the Jamaat has made a mark on the moral economy of Pakistani society in the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province...” (p.264)). As Steve Coll also wrote in *Ghost Wars*: “Jamaat would become a vanguard of Pakistan’s official and clandestine Islamist agendas in Afghanistan and later Kashmir.” (pp.26-27). For general background, see www.jamiat.org/pk. See also *Partisans of Allah* at 273: “Although the maulana [Maududi]’s followers claimed to promote nonsectarian views, the insistence on capital punishment for apostasy was an implicit declaration of jihad against Muslims who refused to embrace the Jamaat-i-Islami’s ideology.”

For the rise of the Jamaat in Pakistan with the Afghan jihad, see Kepel at 100-105. See also *Partisans of Allah* at 274: “Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Jamaat-i-Islami found the opportunity to make a decisive breakthrough in Pakistani politics. By throwing its weight behind the Afghan resistance movement, the organization catapulted itself onto center stage in the American-backed jihad orchestrated with the help of the Pakistani army and its intelligence services.”

The role of Gulbudin Hekmetyar is analyzed in Peter Bergen *Holy War* at 71-75. According to Steve Coll in *Ghost Wars*, Hekmatyar was “backed by officers in ISI’s Afghan bureau, operatives from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Jamaat-e-Islami, officers from Saudi intelligence and Arab volunteers from a dozen countries.” (p.181.) See also Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 and Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror*, New Delhi, India: Roli Books, 2006.

A full biography of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, long-time Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami, can be accessed at www.jamaat.org. For Qazi Hussain Ahmad's rivals, see Tim McGirk, "General's Election," *Time*, October 7, 2002; Rick Bragg, "A Nation Challenged," *New York Times*, October 6, 2001; Staff Report, "Maulana Diesel Tag Meant to Disgrace Me: Fazi," *Daily Times*, November 12, 2008.

Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "A \$4 Million Ransom?" *Newsweek*, February 6, 2008: "Five months after the release of the 21 surviving South Korean hostages who had been captured by the Taliban in July, Afghan insurgents are claiming that Seoul paid a hefty ransom for the Christian missionaries' freedom. In an interview in this week's edition of *Afaq*, a Pashtu-language magazine published in neighboring Pakistan, senior Taliban leader Ustad Yasir confirmed that a large ransom indeed had been paid. "If we were going to free them without any payment, [the hostage taking] would not have been worth it," he said. "The best way to release them was with a ransom payment." Two hostages were executed before the others were released. Another senior Taliban commander, who would only speak on condition of anonymity for security purposes, tells NEWSWEEK that the South Korean government paid at least \$4 million for the missionaries' release and that it delivered the cash to the insurgents in the Pakistani frontier city of Quetta."

On the role of the Emir (or Amir), Vali Nasr, *The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, writes: "The amir is the supreme source of authority in the Jamaat and can demand the unwavering obedience of all members." (p. 53).

For the JI's infiltration of the ISI and the Army, see Philip Jenkins, "Clerical Terror," *The New Republic*, December 24, 2008: "Jamaatis [members of Jamaat Islami] infiltrated Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments, which, by the

1970s, were rife with hard-line Islamist views. These agencies, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), became the main conduit for Saudi money and influence, a link that became all the stronger during the Afghan war. In Kashmir, too, JI cooperated closely with ISI and sponsored its own mujahedin militia.” See also *Partisans of Allah* at 264: “At the ideological level, the Jamaat-i-Islami has remained committed to Mawdudi’s ideal of precipitating an intellectual revolution through education and the systematic infiltration of key state institutions like the army.”

On A.Q. Khan, see David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance*, at 181: “Khan was once at the center of almost every major nuclear flash-point the United States faces today. It was Khan who sold Iran the uranium enrichment equipment and designs that put it within reach of a bomb and on a collision course with the West. It was Khan who sold the North Korean those centrifuges, which they thought they needed to explore a new path to making weapons, after their first efforts – producing plutonium from an aging nuclear reactor – were shut down by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s. And it was Khan who not only delivered the Libyans more than \$100 million worth in centrifuges but threw in a bonus, wrapped inside the plastic bags from the dry cleaner near his house: the nearly complete blueprints for the bomb China set off in the mid-1960s.” See also Salman Masood and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Frees Nuclear Dealer in Snub to U.S,” *New York Times*, February 7, 2009 and Joby Warrick, “Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan is Freed from House Arrest,” *Washington Post*, February 7, 2009.

On General Hameed Gul and his role, see Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban* at 128-29. The United States has requested that the United Nations place Hameed Gul, former General in charge of the ISI, on the list of international terrorists. See Staff Report,

“U.S. Wants Four ex-ISI Officials Declared Terrorists,” *The News*, December 4, 2008; Zahid Hussain and Tom Wright, “Reports Depict Pakistani Ex-Spy as Taliban Link,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 2010; Andrew McGregor, “Former Military Intelligence Chief Hamid Gul Blends Pakistani Nationalism and Islamic Revolution,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume IX, Issue 4, January 28, 2011; and interview of Hamid Gul in *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), September 11, 2011.

American intelligence officials believe that the ISI has significantly assisted the Taliban and other Jihadi militants since 9/11. See Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” *New York Times*, July 30, 2008 (CIA has evidence that ISI has “deepened their ties with some militant groups that were responsible for the surge of violence in Afghanistan”); Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2008 (American intercepted communications between ISI and terrorists who attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul show that ISI “helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing... The ISI officers had not been renegades,” and their actions were authorized by superiors); David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” *New York Times*, August 12, 2007; Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” *New York Times*, December 8, 2008 (ISI aided terrorist group responsible for attacks in Mumbai, India); and David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Puzzle,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2009 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen quoted as stating that the leaders of Pakistan’s Army now “recognize that they’ve got to get out of where they’ve been, which is in support of these militants.”). See also Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 221 (“To maintain its

influence among the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, the ISI developed a two-track policy of protecting the Taliban while handing over al Qaeda Arabs and other non-Afghans to the United States.”); Bruce Riedel, at 86 (“The Taliban apparatus in Pakistan’s madrassas was not dismantled, and many Taliban officials continued to operate in Pakistani cities, particularly Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. By 2004 they were openly fundraising in Quetta again. No major Taliban official has ever been arrested in Pakistan.”); Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” *Survival*, 49:1, Spring 2007, at 18: (“There is virtual unanimity among United States, NATO, UN and Afghan officials that Pakistani assistance [to the Taliban] is significant. The ISI has reportedly provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban fighters. The ISI has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar and other areas in Pakistan.”); Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2007: (“Intelligence collected during Western military offensives... confirmed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support the Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province, in western Pakistan.”); David E. Sanger, at 144; Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007 and Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 31:2, Spring 2008, at 7-32. See also “Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” *New York Times*, September 22, 2011 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role->

[in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=admiral%20mike%20mullen&st=cse\)](http://in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=admiral%20mike%20mullen&st=cse)

General Ahmad Shujaa Pasha, the head of the ISI, explaining why he is unwilling to apprehend the Taliban leadership, who are reportedly in Quetta, said: “They [the Taliban leaders] believe jihad is their obligation. Isn’t that freedom of opinion?” Susanne Koelbl, “Interview: Pakistan’s New Intelligence Chief,” *Der Spiegel*, January 6, 2009. See also Helene Cooper, “Dreaming of Splitting the Taliban,” *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.

Ameerul Azeem, secretary of the Jamaat-e-Islami, told the *New York Times* that Khalid Sheik Mohammed should be considered a “hero to Islam,” several days after his arrest from the house of a Jamaat member. See Erick Eckholm, “Islamic Party: Qaeda Operative is ‘Hero,’” *New York Times*, March 5, 2003.

According to the *New York Times*, a senior Pakistani government admitted: “It’s a game. The U.S. is being taken for a ride.” The ISI protects the Taliban, hands over a few Al Qaeda operatives, and the US funnels aid to the ISI and Army to go after the Taliban and Al Qaeda. “The reason the Pakistani security services support the Taliban is for money: after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani military concluded that keeping the Taliban alive was the surest way to win billions in aid that Pakistan needed to survive. The military’s complicated relationship with the Taliban is part of what one official called the Pakistani military’s ‘strategic games.’” See Dexter Filkins, “Right At the Edge,” *New York Times*, September 7, 2008. See also David E. Sanger at 144 and 245-46: “In return for the American billions, Pakistani forces or intelligence operatives occasionally picked off a few al Qaeda leaders (though even that had slowed to a trickle). But they were actively supporting the Taliban and even

some of the militants in the tribal regions. In a world of fungible money--that \$ 10 billion in American aid was paid straight to the Pakistani treasury--it was almost as if the American taxpayers were making monthly deposits in the Taliban's bank accounts."

JI leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad repeatedly met with Osama bin Laden, and even hosted him at Jamaat headquarters. On January 28, 2003, Khalid Sheik Muhammad was arrested in Rawalpindi from the house of a JI member. The JI leader also personally received funds from the ISI. See "Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Osama bin Laden," *Daily Times*, March 20, 2006. The house of the JI member was located in a secure military housing estate in Rawalpindi. See also Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, at 227; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 226: "The Jamiat connection to al Qaeda proved deeply contentious. The Jamiat is Pakistan's most ideological Islamic party, with close links to the army and the ISI. On behalf of the ISI it had spawned numerous extremists group to fight in Kashmir and had twice helped the military undermine the government of Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s. Opposition politicians alleged militants had been arrested from Jamiat members' homes in Karachi and Lahore, while the Jamiat leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, denied that al Qaeda even existed."

Bin Laden's initial connections when he arrived in Pakistan to help the Afghan jihad were through the Jamaat Islami. See Steve Coll *The Bin Ladens*, at 250-51. During 1985 and 1986, Bin Laden was in Peshawar, Pakistan, in contact with JI and other local Islamists, before he set up his first camp in Afghanistan in 1986. See Peter Bergen *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 46-47; Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, at 156-58; Wright, *The Looming Tower*, at 128; Bergen, *Holy War*, at 59; Coll, *The Bin*

Ladens at 290-91. In his interview, Zeddy places the date of his meeting of Bin Laden to help him find a location to set up a camp in 1985. While some sources place Bin Laden's first camp at Jaji as being established in 1985 (See Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 46-47), all the others listed above place it at some time during 1986.

Bin Laden's education and background are described in Coll, *The Bin Ladens*, at 137-52.

Bin Laden's worldview during the mid-1980's is examined in Wright, *The Looming Tower* at 172; Bergen, *Holy War* at 54 and 67; and Coll, *Ghost Wars* at 163.

For the ISI's relationship to Jamaat and the ISI's role in arming the Afghan resistance, see Rashid, *Taliban* at 130 quoting Olivier Roy: "The organization, arming and financing of the Afghan Mujahideen was 'a joint venture between Saudi [intelligence], the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI.'" The "lucrative management" of the flow of arms to the Afghan Mujahideen and its benefits to JI's finances is referenced in Vali Nasr at 61.

The young Mujahideen coming to fight in Afghanistan "might be moved by altruism, but they also sought a touch of cool." Coll, *The Bin Ladens* at 254.

Background on the financing of political parties in Pakistan is set forth in the Pakistan Report by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006. See also Amir Rana, "Jihadis Seek Eid Donations despite Ban," *Daily Times*, January 29, 2004.

The corruption of the Jamaat and Jihadi groups generally in Pakistan is also noted in Jessica Stern, *In the Name of God* at 136-37; 213-16

The prominence of the Jihadi military training camps near Mansehra has been reported by David Rohde and Carlotta Gall, “In a Corner of Pakistan a Debate Rages: Are Terrorist Camps Still Functioning?” *New York Times*, August 28, 2005; Mark Kukis, “Life at Camp Jihad,” Salon.com, October 3, 2002; James Rupert, “Terrorist Camps Thriving,” *Newsday*, July 22, 2005 and Zulfiqar Ali, Mansehra Militant Camp Humming Again,” *Indian Express*, July 11, 2005. See also Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan’s Network of Terror*, New Delhi: Roli Books, 2006; Sreeram Chaulia, “Deadly Double Game,” *Asia Times*, October 10, 2006: “By 1995, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the Jamaat-e-Islami to raise a Taliban-type force of young Pakistani students to fight Indian forces in Kashmir.”

“The Al-Badr is the first Jihadi organization to have introduced suicide attacks into the sub-continent. Al-Badr has its headquarters in the Mansehra district of the North-West Frontier Province, with Pashtuns making up the largest part of al-Badr. Al-Badr was an active participant in the Indo-Pakistani Kargil war of 1999.” Mukhtar Khan “Kashmir’s Al-Badr Mujahideen Hard Hit by Indian Offensive,” *Terrorism Focus* (Jamestown Foundation), January 21, 2009. For more on Al-Badr, see the South Asia Terrorism Portal report on Al Badr (www.sato.org) (“The Al Badr is reported to have close linkages with the Inter-Services Intelligence and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.”) and Staff Report, “Who are the Kashmiri Militants?” *BBC News*, June 4, 2006.

On the Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India in 1999, see Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Policy Paper Series, 2002:

“Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting.” Yet as one former Pakistani Army chief acknowledged, “In ten years of insurgency, we never allowed our [Pakistani] troops to operate with the militants but now that taboo has been broken.” Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 412 note 35. As Pakistan faced retaliation from Indian forces, “there was disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment.” Alan Sipress and Thomas Ricks, “India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in 1999,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2002. With Pakistan forced to withdraw under heavy American pressure (See Riedel), “Pakistan lost on all counts.” (Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 42.) But years later, General Musharraf was still claiming that the Jihadis had achieved a great success: “Kargil was a military success...diplomatically it highlighted Kashmir....That was something the Jihadis achieved,” according to Musharraf. Isabel Hilton, “The General in His Labyrinth,” *The New Yorker*, August 12, 2002. For an analysis of the Kargil conflict, see also *Descent into Chaos*, at 41-42 and notes 35-40 at page 412; Coll, *Ghost Wars* at 476; Bruce Riedel, *Id.*; A.R. Siddiqi, “Musharraf’s Kargil Demarche: Kargil Reversed,” *Dawn*, December 31, 2003; Peter Popham, “Armies Begin to Withdraw in Kashmir,” *The Independent*, July 13, 1999; Muddassir Rizvi, “Sharif Faces a New Front at Home,” *Asia Times*, July 8, 1999 and July 15, 1999; and B. Raman, “Kargil: Post-Mortem,” South Asia Analysis Group Paper, August 2, 1999.

According to David Sanger of the *New York Times*, in early 2008, “Al Qaeda and other militant groups were focusing anew on the Holy Grail that eluded them before 9/11: stealing the secrets to the Pakistani bomb.” (*The Inheritance*, p. 178) Sanger cites an American intelligence report that Al Qaeda was renewing its efforts

to obtain access to nuclear weapons, including recruiting scientists with radical Islamist sympathies to “seek jobs within [Pakistan’s] nuclear infrastructure.” Sanger, *The Inheritance*, at 178. Indeed, Al Qaeda had made numerous past efforts to obtain access to nuclear weapons, including a meeting between Osama bin Laden and former Pakistani nuclear weapons in August 2001. See David E. Sanger, “The Worst Pakistan Nightmare for Obama,” *New York Times*, January 11, 2009. See also Steven Erlanger, “Lax Nuclear Security in Russia is Cited as Way for bin Laden to Get Arms,” *New York Times*, November 12, 2001; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 120-21.

Chapter Five

Interviews of Shaheed and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008 in Pakistan, with follow up from 2009 through 2011.

For a physical description of bin Laden, see Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens* and Peter Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* and *Holy War, Inc.* at 18.

On the meaningless of the border—the so-called Durand Line—between Pakistan and Afghanistan, see David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance*: “While Americans rightly regard Pakistan and Afghanistan as separate countries, to the Taliban and other Pashtun tribal leaders, it is all one friendly, familiar piece of territory. To them, the border, formally known as the Durand Line, is just a Western invention, an invisible boundary named for a long-dead Brit. It is meaningless to them; it only means something to the American military and NATO, for whom it has long been a wall over which they could not pass.” (p.241). On Pakistan’s trucks, see James

Parchman, "Trucking in Technicolor on Pakistan's Highways," *New York Times*, June 24, 2011.

For a description of Pakistan's nuclear headquarters and the Strategic Plans Division, see David E. Sanger, "The Worst Pakistan Nightmare for Obama," *New York Times*, January 11, 2009. For r background on the Pakistani Army and its officer corps, see Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 and Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

The entire 72nd chapter or *Surah* of the Holy Qur'an is devoted to the jinn, and there are numerous other references throughout the Qur'an. For the significance of jinn in Islamic belief and practice, see Mustafa Ashour, *The Jinn in the Qur'an and the Sunna*, London: Dar Al-Taqwa, 2000 and Umar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, *The World of Jinn and Devils*, Boulder: Al Basheer, 1998. The *Baithak* sessions are described in Mumtaz Nasir, "Baithak: Exorcism in Peshawar (Pakistan)," *Asian Folklore Studies*, Vol. 46, 1987, pp. 159-78.

The government education system in Pakistan is generally described by Shehyrar Fazli in "Pakistan: Stop Supporting Failing Schools," *International Crisis Group Commentary*, September 17, 2004 and "Poor Parents Struggle to Keep Up with Schools," *Daily Times* (Lahore, Pakistan), January 20, 2008; Moeed Yusuf, *Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan*, Analysis Paper Number 14, October 2008, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2008 at 3-5; and Griff Witte, "Poor Schooling Slows Anti-Terrorism Effort in Pakistan," *Washington Post*, January 17, 2010.

The prevalence of corporal punishment in Pakistani schools is reported in numerous Pakistani news accounts. See Staff Report, “Drive against Corporal Punishment at Schools Launched,” *The News*, December 28, 2008 and Muqaddam Khan, “Corporal Punishment Banned in NWFP,” *Dawn*, January 14, 2004. . According to a national survey of Pakistani school students conducted in 2005 by the Government of Pakistan, Save the Children and UNICEF, 100 percent of the sample of student respondents interviewed reported that they have received corporal punishment, while 7 percent reported sustaining serious injuries as a result of corporal punishment. Press Release by UNICEF Pakistan at http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/media_3667.htm?q=printme (accessed January 31, 2009). According to the Islamabad-based Society for the Protection of the Rights of Children, a local NGO, pandemic corporal punishment in schools (a “culturally accepted form of child abuse”) is “responsible for one of the highest dropout rates in the world.” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Pakistan: Corporal Punishment Key Reason for School Dropouts,” <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78275> (accessed January 31, 2009).

The prevalence of “Eve-teasing” in Pakistan and specifically in Peshawar and the North West Frontier Province has been reported by numerous news accounts from Pakistani and international media. See Staff Report, “No Check on Eve Teasing,” *Daily Times*, October 1, 2008, Staff Report, “Eve Teasing Incidents on the Rise,” *Daily Times*, June 9, 2008; Nadia Asjad, “Pakistan’s Taboo on Sex Abuse,” *BBC News*, November 17, 2004 ; Kamran Shafi, “Visit Pakistan and Be Leered At,” *Daily Times*, November 23, 2006.

Sexual violence against women in Pakistan and students in elementary and secondary schools, as well as university, is also pandemic. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “sexual harassment at all levels has spiraled out of control.” Annual Report, *State of Human Rights in 2007*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad at pp. 145-61. The Human Rights Commission Annual Report also cites a report by the Pakistan Pediatric Association, which found that 15 percent of all children in Pakistan had suffered at least one incident of sexual abuse. *Id.* at page 166. In 2010, the Human Rights Commission Annual Report indicated that roughly 800 women were victims of “honor killings” – murders committed to preserve the honor of the victims’ family members—and 2,900 women were victims of rape. Annual Report, *State of Human Rights in 2010*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, and available at <http://www.hrcp-web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf>. See also Staff Report, “Rape, Mutilation: Pakistan’s Tribal Justice for Women,” *Dawn*, August 9, 2011.

The university culture and intensity of political parties in Pakistani campus life is analyzed by Haider A.H. Mullick in “Towards a Civic Culture: Student Activism and Political Dissent in Pakistan,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Summer/Fall 2008. The role of Jamaat’s student organization is also described in full in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994 at 61-80. For background on Jamaat-e-Islami, see their website, www.jamaat.org. Party histories and profiles were also set forth in Staff Report, “Party Profiles,” *Dawn Weekly Herald*, December 30, 2008. See also Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1994: “The IJT [Jamaat’s student organization] uses strong-arm tactics to resolve the academic problems of its members or associates, provides university housing to them, and in some cases gains admission for them to the university.” (p. 70.)

The case of Shaheed and his colleagues is an excellent real-life illustration of the importance of social networks theorized by Marc Sageman, particularly the intense group dynamics as completely transforming the participants “in a process of in-group love.” See Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* and Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. Sageman specifically identifies “radical Muslim student associations” as a critical network to mobilize young Muslims (*Leaderless Jihad* at 85).

For more information and sources on the Mansehra training camp, see Chapter 4 and accompanying notes. The prominence of the jihadi military training camps near Mansehra are reported on by David Rohde and Carlotta Gall, “In a Corner of Pakistan a Debate Rages: Are Terrorist Camps Still Functioning?” *New York Times*, August 28, 2005; Mark Kukis, “Life at Camp Jihad,” *Salon.com*, October 3, 2002; James Rupert, “Terrorist Camps Thriving,” *Newsday*, July 22, 2005 and Zulfiqar Ali, “Mansehra Militant Camp Humming Again,” *Indian Express*, July 11, 2005.

The importance of dreams to bin Laden generally and around the 9/11 attacks specifically is described in Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower* at 402-03. The significance of dreams generally in jihadi culture is analyzed by Robert Fisk, “Visions that Come to Men as They Sleep,” *The Independent*, January 26, 2008 and Iain Edgar, “The Inspirational Night Dream in the Motivation and Justification of Jihad,”

Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions (University of California Press), Volume 11, Issue 2, 2007 at 59-76: “Islam is probably the largest night dream culture in the world today....The experience of the true dream (*ruya*) is a fundamental, inspirational, and even strategic, part of the contemporary militant jihadist movement.”

The support of the ISI for the Taliban after their defeat in 2001 is examined at length in Chapters Three and Four, and accompanying notes *supra*. Specifically, American intelligence officials believe that the ISI has significantly assisted the Taliban and other Jihadi militants since 9/11. See Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” *New York Times*, July 30, 2008 (CIA has evidence that ISI has “deepened their ties with some militant groups that were responsible for the surge of violence in Afghanistan”); Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2008 (American intercepted communications between ISI and terrorists who attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul show that ISI “helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing... The ISI officers had not been renegades,” and their actions were authorized by superiors); David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” *New York Times*, August 12, 2007; Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” *New York Times*, December 8, 2008 (ISI aided terrorist group responsible for attacks in Mumbai, India); and David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Puzzle,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2009 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen quoted as stating that the leaders of Pakistan’s Army now “recognize that they’ve got to get out of where they’ve been, which is in support of these militants.”). See also

Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 221 (“To maintain its influence among the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, the ISI developed a two-track policy of protecting the Taliban while handing over al Qaeda Arabs and other non-Afghans to the United States.”); Bruce Riedel at 86 (“The Taliban apparatus in Pakistan’s madrassas was not dismantled, and many Taliban officials continued to operate in Pakistani cities, particularly Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. By 2004 they were openly fundraising in Quetta again. No major Taliban official has ever been arrested in Pakistan.”); Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” *Survival*, 49:1, Spring 2007, at 18: (“There is virtual unanimity among United States, NATO, UN and Afghan officials that Pakistani assistance [to the Taliban] is significant. The ISI has reportedly provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban fighters. The ISI has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar and other areas in Pakistan.”); Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2007: (“Intelligence collected during Western military offensives... confirmed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support the Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province, in western Pakistan.”).

On the growing unrest in Pakistan during 2008 and the increasing radicalization of the youth, see Moeed Yusuf at 4-5. See also Peter Bergen and Ken Ballen, *The National*, July 5, 2008, which can be accessed at:

<http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakJunSept.pdf> (accessed

February 20, 2009); Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, “Taliban Threaten to Kill

Officials Held Hostage,” *New York Times*, July 19, 2008; Khalid Aziz, “Mangal Bagh and the Fragmenting State,” *The News*, July 1, 2008; Amir Mir, “Pakistan Tops Iraq, Afghanistan in Suicide Bombing Deaths,” *The News*, September 15, 2008. In general, see also Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 31:2, Spring 2008 at 7-32 and Caroline Wadhams, “Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan,” *Center for American Progress*, November 2008; Giff Witte, “Poor Schooling Slows Anti-terrorism Effort in Pakistan”, *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2010, and available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/16/AR2010011602660.html>.

Dua, or supplication to Allah, is an Islamic practice of expression that is used to call out to Allah for help or guidance. *Dua* is mentioned throughout the Qur’an and Hadith. For more information, please refer to the following, including, but not limited to: *Surah Al-Furqan*, 25:77, *Surah Al-Mumin* 40:60, *Surah Al-Baqarah*, 2:186.

The desire of the Jihadi militants to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is examined as well in Chapter Four, *supra*. As Bruce Riedel, former senior advisor on Middle East and South Asian affairs in the White House wrote: “The growing presence of al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan should serve as a cause for deep concern. The greatest possible threat is that al Qaeda will recruit a senior Pakistani military officer in control of some part of the national arsenal, who may then secretly pass one or two weapons to the terrorists and use his senior position to cover up the theft.” Bruce Riedel at 133. See also Peter Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, Chapter 11, “Al Qaeda’s Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” at 337-49.

Shaheed's quotes from the Qur'an are from *Surah Al-Maidah* (The Table) 5:32 and 5:48, and from *Surah Yasin*, 36:65. Two Jews visiting the Prophet is cited in Hadith (words, actions, inactions of the Prophet Muhammad that are not considered the word of Allah, but, rather, secondary text used to understand the Qur'an, Islamic jurisprudence, and the Islamic way of living life). Sunan Tirmidhi, *Book of Exegesis*, Bani Israel, Hadith # 3069.

The Tablighi Jamaat is best known in the United States as the organization through which John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban, became radicalized before being trained by Al Qaeda and fighting with the Taliban. See Evan Thomas, "A Long Strange Trip to the Taliban," *Newsweek*, December 17, 2001. Other Americans have also been alleged to initially been radicalized through the Tablighi Jamaat as well, including Jose Padilla, the American Al Qaeda recruit held for allegedly planning to set off a "dirty" radiological bomb, and Richard Reid, the British Al Qaeda member and so-called "shoe bomber." Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003. For background on the Tablighi Jamaat, see Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008 at 267-68 and at 280-81 ("An estimated two million people typically converge at the Tablighi Jamaat's annual meeting in Lahore, of which 90 percent are said to be Pathans [Pashtuns] from Peshawar and the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan."). In fact, the Tablighi Jamaat is now "the largest preaching mission of any religion in the world," and their annual meeting has been estimated to attract the largest concentration of Muslims after the hajj. See I.H. Raashed, "Rejecting Publicity, Yet Drawing Millions," *Dawn*, October 24, 2002 and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game," *Survival*, Vol. 49 no. 1 Spring 2007, at

15-32. There are two views of Tablighi Jamaat. The first is that according to the FBI and American intelligence officials, Tablighi members are “ideal recruits” for Al Qaeda and that Al Qaeda has repeatedly “used them for recruiting.” See Lisa Myers, “FBI Monitors Islamic Group for Terror Ties,” *NBC News*, January 18, 2005 and Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny,” *New York Times*, July 14, 2003. See also Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005. The other view is that they are a peaceful movement designed to return Muslims to Islam and convert non-Muslims through “heart-to-heart” communication. See I.H. Raashed, *Id.* and Barbara D. Metcalf, “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council: *After 9/11*, New York, 2004 (“No word resonates more in Tablighi reports of their experiences than *shukun*, the “peace” they experience as a foretaste of the paradise they believe their efforts (jihad) in this path of Allah help merit.”). A third point of view is presented by Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic Law at UCLA and former teenage member of the Tablighi: “I don’t believe there’s a sinister plot where they’re in bed with Osama bin Laden but are hiding it. But I think that the militants exploit the alienated and withdrawn social attitude created by the Tablighis by fishing in the Tablighi pond.” Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny,” *New York Times*, July 14, 2003; Nicholas Howenstein, “Islamist Networks: The Case of Tablighi Jamaat,” *United States Institute of Peace Briefing*, October 2006 and Maulana Aashiq Ilaahi, *Six Fundamentals*, Lahore: Tablighi Jamaat (undated).

For news accounts of the Marriott terrorist attack and the claim of responsibility by the *Fidayeen-e-Islam*, see Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Islamabad’s

'Message from Hell,'" *BBC News*, September 20, 2008; Staff Report, "Dozens Killed in Pakistan Attack," *BBC News*, September 20, 2008; Nic Robertson and Zain Verjee, "Deadly Blast Targets Marriott Hotel in Islamabad," *CNN*, September 21, 2008; Zein Basravi and Reza Sayah, "Official: Hotel Blast 'biggest attack' in 7 years for Pakistan," *CNN*, September 21, 2008; Carlotta Gall, "Bombing at Hotel in Pakistan Kills at Least 40," *New York Times*, September 21, 2008; Omar Waraich, "Blast Leaves Pakistan Shaken," *Time*, September 21, 2008; Staff Report, "Militants Claim Marriott Attack," *BBC News*, September 22, 2008; Staff Report, "'Fidayeen-e-Islam' Claims Islamabad Bombing," *Daily Times*, September 23, 2008; Reuters Report, "Pakistani Spies Hear Al Qaeda Celebrating Blast," *New York Times*, September 23, 2008; Staff Report, "Pakistani Spies Hear Qaeda Celebrating Marriott Blast," *Daily Times*, September 24, 2008; Editorial, "Countering Al Qaeda's Ideology," *Daily Times*, September 24, 2008; Simon Robinson, "Islamabad After the Marriott Bombing," *Time*, October 2, 2008; Dexter Filkins, "The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan," *The New York Times*, September 28, 2008.

Chapter Six

Interviews of Kamal and his colleagues/relations occurred over the summer and fall of 2008, and throughout 2009, 2010, and 2011, in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Austria, the United States and elsewhere. Two Saudi Ministry of Interior officials independently confirmed to me the identity of Kamal as a member of the royal family (the Al al-Shaykh). Other inmates confirmed to me Kamal's imprisonment.

"By the early twentieth century, the Al-Shaykhs had become Nejd's most prestigious family of religious scholars." Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens*, at 70 -71. See

also Weston, *Prophets and Princes* at 129-29 and Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2004, at 160-61. See also Kepel at p. 155: "Observers have estimated that approximately five percent of total revenues are diverted to the dynasty's many princes." Excellent studies on Wahhab and Wahhabism are: Natana J. DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004 and Mohammed Ayoub and Hasan Kosebalaban, *Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State*, Boulder: Rienner, 2009.

On the prevalence on so-called "summer marriages," see Lulwa Shalhoub, "Children are the Main Victims of Summer Marriages," *Arab News*, July 20, 2007.

Peter Harrigan, "Riyadh: Arab Cultural Capital," *Saudi Aramco World*, July/August 2000 outlines some of the cultural traditions of the *majlis* and tents. See also David E. Long, *Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005; Zahir Othman, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Al-Turath, 2006; and Ministry of Information and Culture, *Saudi Arabia: Views from the Kingdom*, Riyadh: Ministry of Information and Culture, 2006.

Indonesian history is covered best by Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003, at 29-30 and 68-69, in particular. See also Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia Peoples and History*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 2003 and M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (3rd edition), Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2001. For the role of *Dukuns*, see Inez Mahony, "The Traditional Healers of East Java," *Inside Indonesia*, Jul-Sept 2003 and Sadanand Dhume, *My Friend the Fanatic: Travels with an*

Indonesian Islamist, Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing, 2008, at 51, 68-69 and 78-81. On the Front to Defend Islam (FPI), see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree*, Asia Briefing No. 78, July 7, 2008. See also International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, Asia Briefing No. 10, October 10, 2001; Sadanand Dhume, *My Friend the Fanatic: Travels with an Indonesian Islamist*, Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing, 2008, at 120-21 and Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

For an article on Bilal ibn Rabah, Islam's first muezzin, chosen by the Prophet Muhammad, see Barry Hoberman, "The First Muezzin," *Saudi Aramco World*, July/August 1983.

General information on King Saud University can be accessed at its website: <http://www.ksu.edu.sa/Pages/default.aspx>

The three best sources on homosexual and gay life in Saudi Arabia are: Nadya Labi, "The Kingdom in the Closet," *The Atlantic*, May 2007; Brian Whitaker, *Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press, 2006, at 52-57 and John R. Bradley, *Saudi Arabia Exposed*, New York: Palgrave, 2005.

Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab's books translated into English include: Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab, Ismail Raji al Faruqi, translator, *Three Essays on Tawhid*, North American Trust (World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), 1979 and Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab, Sameh Strauch, translator, *The Book of Tawheed*, Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House, 1998. The best overview in English is Natana J. DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From*

Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004:

“Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s rejection of special human insight into the interpretation of scripture is consistent with his broad worldview, in which every individual believer is capable of and responsible for encountering God directly, without the help of human intercessors. Rather than relying on human interpreters of the scriptures, whether for theological or legal issues, he taught that individuals needed to read the scriptures for themselves in order that they might know directly what God had said. His further emphasis on the need to contextualize Qur’anic passages and understand their content, rather than focusing strictly on the Qur’an’s memorized form and word order, reflects his approach to scripture in general. He applied the same methodology to the study and interpretation of *Hadith* (defined *supra*) and: “Faith as a matter of the heart” is based on a *hadith* that states, “Islam is on the exterior, and faith is in the heart.” When asked to explain the difference between Islam and faith, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab replied that speaking of Islam is what leads to faith in the heart. Because faith is a true reflection of what lies in the heart and mind of the believer, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab accorded faith a higher ranking than Islam as ritual perfection.” (Page 80.) See also *Id.* at 74-75; 132-33 and at p. 166.

Accounts of the devastating May 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta can be found by Orlando Guzman, “Eyewitness: Yogyakarta Earthquake,” *BBC News*, May 27, 2006; Staff Report, “Race against time in Java quake,” *BBC News* May 29, 2006; Staff Report, “Aid pours in for Java quake,” *BBC News* May 28, 2006; Staff Report, “U.S. Military Joins Indonesia Quake Relief,” *CBS News*, May 31, 2006 and Lucy Williamson, “Yogyakarta’s hidden wounds,” *BBC News*, May 26, 2007.

An analysis of the Lot citations in the Holy Qur'an is set forth by Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle, "Sexuality, Diversity, and Ethics in the Agenda of Progressive Muslims," in *Progressive Muslims*, Oxford, UK: One World, 2003 at 209-28 and Brian Whitaker, *Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press, 2006 at 177-200. For contemporary attitudes among Saudi youth, see generally, Michael Slackman, "Young Saudis, Vexed and Entranced by Love's Rules," *New York Times*, May 12, 2008 and Afshin Molavi, "Young and Restless in Saudi Arabia," *Smithsonian Magazine*, April 2006.

The role of the Internet to Jihadi radicalization in Saudi Arabia is expertly examined by Christopher Boucek, "The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point, August 2008 (Boucek quotes Saudi Ministry of Interior officials that there are 4.7 million Internet users in Saudi Arabia in 2008, with access to "several thousand" extremist websites.) The role of the Internet and chat rooms in particular to Jihadi radicalization is also examined by Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* at 112-16. See also Thomas Hegghammer, "Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment," *Cultures & Conflicts*, June 12, 2008 ("The Internet has no doubt played a major role in the self-radicalization of many young Saudis."). For gay sites, see Nadya Labi, "The Kingdom in the Closet," *The Atlantic*, May 2007. For Osama bin Laden's reverential view of the pivotal importance of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh, see Translation by Al Jazeera, "Osama bin Laden Condemns Arab Leaders," *Al Jazeera* (audiotape released by Osama bin Laden) , March 14, 2009.

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/03/200931415125325850.html>

(accessed March 20, 2009)

For Saudi citizens funding of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups, see:

1. Declan Walsh, “WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as cash machine for terrorists,” *The Guardian*, December 5, 2010;
2. Eric Lichtblau and Eric Schmitt, “Cash Flow to Terrorists Evade U.S. Efforts,” *New York Times*, December 5, 2010;
3. Editorial, “Follow the Money,” quoting State Department cable by Secretary of State Clinton (“Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.”), *New York Times*, December 8, 2010;
4. Tim Lister, “WikiLeaks cables assess terrorism funding in Saudi Arabia, Gulf states,” CNN, December 6, 2010; and
5. Keith Johnson, “Cables Reflect Tensions Over Terrorism Funding,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 5, 2010.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s program to rehabilitate Jihadis and its “Care Center,” were reported on CNN January 23 and 24, 2009, in a news report by CNN Correspondent and an interview with Ken Ballen. See

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/CNN_FP_LAT.pdf

I spent close to one month at the Care Center in the summer of 2008 and the winter and spring of 2009, interviewing forty-three Jihadi inmates, as well as over a dozen Center and MOI staff and other officials. See also Katherine Zoepf, “Deprogramming Jihadists,” *New York Times*, November 9, 2008; Caryle Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash

and Counseling to Fight Terrorism,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 2008; Jeffrey Fleishmen, “Saudi Arabia Tries to Rehab Radical Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 2007; Drake Bennett, “How to Defuse a Human Bomb,” *Boston Globe*, April 13, 2008; Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2008 and Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Re-Education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” in Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, editors, *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, New York: Routledge, 2009; Bobby Ghosh, “Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?” *Time*, January 27, 2009; Frank Gardner, “Saudi Jails Aim to Tackle Terror,” *BBC News*, January 31, 2008; Robert Lacey, “Rehab the Terrorists...With Love,” *The Daily Beast*, May 21, 2009; and Michael Evans, “‘Betty Ford’ Islamic Militants arrested in Saudi Arabia,” *Times Online*, January 26, 2009.

I also interviewed Juma Al-Dossari over the course of three days in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during August 2008. I interviewed Ghanim Abdul-Rahman Al-Harbi in Riyadh in March 2009. For more information regarding al-Harbi’s detention and release from Gitmo, see Murad Batal al-Shishani, “From Yemen to Detroit: The Expanding Influence of AQAP’s Sa’id al-Shihri”, *Militant Leadership Monitor*, February 28, 2010, pp. 6, Volume 1, Issue 2; see also “Reed Smith Presents 2007 Sean Halpin awards to Doug Spalding and Bernie Casey; Pro Bono Institute President speaks at Reed Smith Pro Lunch”, *The Pro Bono Wire*, May 1, 2007 http://www.imakenews.com/probonoinstitute/e_articlec000907025.cfm?x=b9swG Fq,b65vgQtD. In August 2008, March 2009 and in April 2009, I interviewed the psychiatrist who intensively treated Juma. For the FBI’s intent to prosecute Juma for recruiting the Lackawanna Six, see Dan Herbeck, “Area Terror Cell Numbered 8,

Agent Says,” *The Buffalo News*, June 22, 2008. Additional information on Juma’s life in America, experience with the Lackawanna Six and the actual case of the Lackawanna Six, in addition to my extensive interviews with Juma himself, can be found in four sources: **1.** Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman, “Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case,” *New York Times*, October 12, 2003; **2.** Dan Herbeck and Lou Michel, “Suspected Al Qaeda Recruiters Center of Probe,” *The Buffalo News*, May 19, 2003 and other *Buffalo News* articles by Dan Herbeck; **3.** Frontline, PBS Documentary, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,” October 16, 2003, particularly all of the helpful material posted on the website, including James Sandler, “Kamal Derwish: The Life and Death of An American Terrorist,” Jason Felch, “The Closer: An Al Qaeda Recruiter in the United States: A Profile of Juma Al Dosari,” Roya Aziz and Monica Lam, “Profiles: The Lackawanna Cell,” and the Interview of Salim Alwan, all of which can be accessed in full at

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/> (accessed on January 20, 2009) and **4.** Dina Temple-Raston, *The Jihad Next Door*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2007. Juma’s own writings from Guantanamo are the following: Jumah Al-Dossari, “A Voice from Gitmo’s Darkness,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 2007; Marc Falkoff, editor, *Poems from Guantanamo: The Detainees Speak*, Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 2007 (Juma’s poem is at 32); BBC News Interview of Jumah al-Dossari, August 6, 2008; and Jumah al Dossari, “I’m Home, but Still Haunted by Guantanamo,” *Washington Post*, August 17, 2008. See also Kristy Walker, “Gordon Brown Shakes Hands with former Al Qaeda Terrorists during visit to Saudi Correction Centre,” *Daily Mail*, November 2, 2008 (describes

meeting between Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Juma) and Rosa Prince, “Gordon Brown shakes hands with Muslim extremists during Saudi visit,” *The Telegraph*, November 3, 2008.

After his capture, Said Ali al-Shihri was detained as an “enemy combatant” in Gitmo for nearly six years. Al-Shiri was released from Gitmo in November of 2007.

See <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/372-said-ali-al-shihri>

Upon his release from the Saudi Care Center, he re-enlisted into the ranks of al-Qaeda where he became deputy leader of Al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch. See Robert F. Worth, “2 Ex-Detainees in Qaeda Video”, *The New York Times*, January 25, 2009, and available at

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/world/middleeast/25yemen.html> (Accessed

on March 7, 2009); see also Robert F. Worth, “Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief”, *The New York Times*, January 23, 2009, and available at

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/world/middleeast/23yemen.html> (Accessed

on March 7, 2009). Al-Shihri played a key role on the attack of the American Embassy in Sana, Yemen in September 2008 and the later attempted Christmas attack over Detroit. For more information regarding the life, terrorist activity, detention, and release of al-Shihri, see the following:

1. Sudarsan Raghavan, “Former Guantanamo detainees fuel growing al Qaeda cell”, *The Washington Post*, December 30, 2009, and available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/29/AR2009122902289.html> (Accessed on January 16, 2010)

2. Peter Taylor, "Yemen al-Qaeda link to Guantanamo", *BBC News*, January 13, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8454804.stm> (Accessed on January 16, 2010).
3. Batal al-Shishani, "From Yemen to Detroit: The Expanding Influence of AQAP's Sa'id al-Shihri", *Militant Leadership Monitor*, February 28, 2010, pp. 6, Volume 1, Issue 2.

For Al Qaeda operatives being trained to dissemble and claim torture, see Bret Stephens, "Media Narratives Feed Terrorist Fantasies," *Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 2008, quoting from internal Al Qaeda documents on falsely claiming torture in confinement. For official U.S. government documents, including various Combatant Status Review Board proceedings and Detainee Statements for both Ghanim Abdul Rahman Al Harbi and Said Ali Al Shiri, see the comprehensive collection of such documents maintained by the *New York Times* in "The Guantanamo Docket," which can be accessed at:

<http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?scp=1&sq=The%20Guantanamo%20Docket&st=cse> (accessed March 12, 2009). For Said Al Shiri's return to Al Qaeda, see Robert F. Worth, "Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief," *New York Times*, January 23, 2009 and Robert F. Worth, "2 Ex-Detainees in Qaeda Video," *New York Times*, January 25, 2009, quoting Al Shiri's statement on the Al Qaeda video released. See also Staff Report, "Detainee went from Gitmo to Al Qaeda," *CNN*, January 23, 2009; Staff Report, "Father of Al Shiri Talks," *Saudi Gazette*, January 26, 2009; Brian Ross, "Al Qaeda Leader Behind Northwest Flight 253 Terror Plot Was Released by U.S.," *ABC News*, December 28, 2009;

Kamal's reference to *Surah al-Maidah* is from the Holy Qur'an, 5:49.

For new Islamic thinking in Saudi Arabia see Elizabeth Rubin, “The Jihadi Who Kept Asking Why,” *The New York Times Magazine*, March 7, 2004; Mansour al-Nogaidan, “Losing My Jihadism,” *Washington Post*, July 22, 2007; Robert F. Worth, “Preaching Moderate Islam and Becoming a TV Star,” *New York Times*, January 9, 2009. See generally George Packer, “The Moderate Martyr,” *The New Yorker*, September 11, 2006; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Heart of Islam*, New York: Harper Collins, 2002; Reza Aslan, *No God but God*, New York: Random House, 2005 and Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Grand Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*, New York: Harper Collins, 2005 and PBS Broadcast, “Muslim Televangelists,” May 16, 2008, Episode no. 1137.