Source Notes

The principal sources for this book are my intensive interviews, spanning three years, of the people profiled. While I have corroborated their accounts as much as possible with interviews of other radicals, government officials, family members, friends, media reports, and official government documents, it is their stories I tell. And while my extensive fact-checking was necessary, I felt that to footnote the individual stories would detract, not add to, their integrity. For the Saudi individuals profiled, I also corroborated—or discounted—important facts in their stories with the psychiatrist and psychologists who treated two of the individuals, and for all of the Saudis, senior officials from the Saudi Ministry of Interior. For the Pakistani accounts, I received on background invaluable corroboration from three outstanding Pakistani journalists and a high-ranking senior American intelligence official who oversees Pakistan in his portfolio. While he must remain nameless, I cannot thank him enough for verifying some of the most important points in the Pakistani stories.

I also bring to this book five years of original research, more than a hundred other interviews and extensive academic reading. So, rather than footnotes or endnotes, I have collected here some of my recommendations for further reading, for those who wish to follow up on individual points raised in the book. I have divided my suggestions by chapter for convenience only. There is obviously much overlap between chapters.

In 2004, I founded a non-profit research institute with the goal of acquiring original data on why people support or oppose extremism. The result has been more than thirty public opinion surveys throughout the Muslim world. The extensive results of our research can be found at www.terrorfreetomorrow.org. The broader
conclusions I have learned from nationwide public opinion research throughout the Muslim world necessarily informs the more specific findings on individuals in this book. Public opinion research, though, can only take us so far. As Dr. Jerrold Post, a foremost psychiatrist on terrorists, concludes, “If one really wants to understand ‘what makes terrorists tick,’ the best way is to ask them.” See Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda*, New York: Palgrave, 2007, at p. 9. Similarly, noted terrorism analyst Marc Sageman insightfully tells us that the deeds of terrorists are “so horrific that they are no longer considered human and what we know about humans no longer applies to them. But they are human.” See Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008 at 61.

There are other academic studies examining the factors that have helped create radical Islamist militants. As Jessica Stern concludes: “In real life (as opposed to elegant, parsimonious theory), people have mixed motives for everything they do.” Jessica Stern, *In the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, New York: Harper Collins, 2003. (p. 5). Stern’s work identifies the range of political, religious, social and personal factors that may cause “one person to become a terrorist [and] another to become a saint.” (p. 283). The accepted consensus among scholars is that for terrorists and extremists in general, “their primary shared characteristic is their normalcy, insofar as we understand that term. Psychological studies of terrorists are virtually unanimous on this point.” (Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, New York: Random House, 2006 at 15; See also Jerrold Post at 4-5.) Indeed, Richardson and Stern identify the altruistic motives of many radicals, as well as their desire for glory and recognition, and to redress the humiliation “they perceive themselves as
having suffered.” (Richardson at 94). Some get involved “out of a desire for adventure. Many join out of friendship or through social networks.” (Stern at 4-5). In another context, Thomas Hegghammer cogently analyzes the often-overlooked motive of nationalistic, pan-Islamic solidarity. (See Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment,” Cultures & Conflicts, June 12, 2008.) Marc Sageman’s seminal research has enlightened us particularly on the importance of group dynamics and the crucial role of social networks in amplifying individual moral outrage. (See Leaderless Jihad and Marc Sageman’s earlier study, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). As Sageman elucidates in Leaderless Jihad, radicalization often begins “with a strong sense of moral outrage..., which resonates with their own life experiences.” (p.57) These individuals then connected with others in a network which “educated them in an ideology that framed their moral outrage with their personal life.” (Id.) Joining this “social movement was based to a great degree on friendship and kinship.” (p.68) Sageman describes the intense group dynamics as completely transforming the participants “in a process of in-group love.” (p.86) They become “warriors in pursuit of fame and glory,” (p.80) “heroes,” (p. 159), indeed even “rock stars” (p.81) within their environment. As Sageman concludes, these “generally idealistic young people seeking ...glory fighting for justice...are essentially romantic men and women chasing a dream.” (pp 35, 33)

The individuals presented in this book corroborate to varying degrees the best of the academic research outlined above. What this book’s profiles add to the academic literature—in addition to emphasizing human complexity and “mixed motives”—is the importance of understanding the unique culture, religious beliefs,
and perspective of the militants and jihadis themselves. They may be chasing a dream, but it is a very particular kind of dream, within a particular religious and cultural context.

There have also been a great deal of studies about the history and impact of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Islamist radicals, Jihadi militants, and current changes in the Middle East and Pakistan/Afghanistan. The select few, which comprise the very best, and which I can highly recommend, are:


It is important to remember throughout my book, as I state in the introduction, the interpretations of Islam, which motivate the jihadis profiled, do not necessarily represent Islam or Muslims as a whole. This book is about jihadis—in particular those featured—and not about Islam or Muslims in general.
Chapter One

As Bruce Riedel, former CIA veteran, senior White House adviser on Middle East and South Asian issues and chair of President Obama’s strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan, writes:

“If Pakistan is the most important and difficult nation to deal with in order to destroy al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia is probably second on the list.” See Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, at p. 146.

For more background on the history, economy and importance of Saudi Arabia, see the following:


News articles on Terror Free Tomorrow’s research in Saudi Arabia, including a front-page story from the leading reform newspaper, Al Watan article, can be accessed at:


Interviews of Ahmad Al Shayea and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008, and throughout 2009 to 2011 in Saudi Arabia.

For the conservative background and culture of Buraydah, see Edward Pilkington, “Like Dallas Policed by the Taliban,” The Guardian, July 2, 2002.


A brief overview of the usage, history, custom and benefits of the chewing and use of miswak is provided by Iman Sherif, Staff Writer at Gulf News, in “Miswak—the wonder twig”, and can be accessed at http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/miswak-the-wonder-twig-1.854099.

According to Gulf News, the miswak is a twig taken from the Salvadora Persica
referred to as *arak*, and is said to have originated 7,000 years ago by the Pharaohs in Egypt. *Miswak* is chewed by many individuals throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and is not necessarily confined to jihadis (nor uniformly practiced by all jihadis).


The Tribal custom of marrying a relative that I allude to in Ahmad’s household is a practice that is limited by the *Shari’ah* and the Qur’an. Followers of Islam are forbidden from marrying his or her issue, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews, but are allowed to marry cousins, including first cousins.

Over the course of 2008 through 2011, I conducted more than forty-three interviews of young Saudi jihadis. I also conducted interviews of seventeen different Saudi Ministry of Interior and other government officials, both at the supervisory level and those with direct responsibility for monitoring and/or rehabilitating known jihadi militants. I found that the motivations for Saudis leaving to fight in Iraq or otherwise to become jihadis are as varied as the individuals involved. A senior American intelligence official, who I interviewed in March and April 2009, made an important overarching point to me. This high-level official told me that: “For the vast majority of Islamic jihadis, if they had grown up in Iowa instead of the Middle East, they would’ve had joined the Marine Corps instead.”

In this respect, as well as others, Ahmad Al-Shayea is representative of the overwhelming majority of Saudi jihadis, particularly those who went to Iraq to fight. First, among Saudis, there is a strong feeling of pan-Islamic solidarity or Islamic nationalism, in addition to religious fervor. “Americans can’t imagine how a young man living a decent life in Riyadh could feel so much love and passion for a fellow Muslim and feel compelled to go and fight when he sees television footage of Iraqis or Afghans being killed and tortured. But that’s the result of strong Islamic blood ties.” Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Iraq: Spinning Off Arab Terrorists?” The Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2005. See also Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home,” New York Times, April 23, 2004. Second, numerous accounts, like Al-Shayea, portray an apparently sincere and altruistic motive to help those who are suffering—in particular, motivated by the torture at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. According to the senior U.S. military interrogator responsible for the capture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, “the number one

The consensus view has been that the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq came from Saudi Arabia (Susan B. Glasser, “Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudi,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005), with estimates ranging from half to over 70 percent. Further, “American commanders say that foreigners make up more than 90


For general background on fighting in Iraq and the Iraq war, the following books are recommended:

4. Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, New York: Harper Collins, 2004; and

There are three major and distinct news reports about Ahmad Al-Shayea. The first was by USA TODAY about a month after the bombing, which is based entirely on a videotape of a statement made by Ahmad to Iraqi officials and released to USA TODAY by the Iraqi Interior Ministry. (See Stephen Komarow and Sabah al-Anbaki, “Would-be Suicide Bomber Angry at Those who Sent Him,” USA TODAY, January 24, 2005.) The second report is by CNN’s Nic Robertson, broadcast on September 14, 2007, comprising an interview of less than a minute with Ahmad, along with the slightly longer accompanying article on CNN.com. See Nic Robertson, “Failed Suicide Bomber Turns on Al Qaeda,” CNN, September 14, 2007 and at CNN.com http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/0914/reformed.jihadist/index.html (Accessed August 6, 2008). The final is an Associated Press article, widely circulated, based on a two-hour interview of Ahmad in a Riyadh hotel room in July 2007 by AP reporter Donna Abu-Nasr. See Donna Abu-Nasr, “Truck Bomber Turns Against Jihad,” MSNBC, July 29, 2007; Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Turns his Back on Jihad,” USA TODAY, July 28, 2007. I conducted over 20 hours of interviews with Ahmad, as well as an active correspondence, over the course of summer of 2008 and again during the winter and spring of 2009, as well as throughout 2010 and later. In substance, all of the reports corroborate the main features of Ahmad’s account. The important facts are in accord. There are, however, some minor discrepancies among the three reports, and in addition, between the reports and what Ahmad told me in far more detailed and lengthier interviews. For example, Nic Robertson reports that 12 people died in the attacks; yet CNN at the time reported eight fatalities. CNN also
quotes Ahmad as stating that he never intended to be a suicide bomber, but was “tricked” by Al Qaeda. There are not many other details in the short CNN piece. The initial USA TODAY report of 2005, based on the Iraqi videotape, has Ahmad stating he left for Syria and Iraq after Ramadan; was brought across to Iraq by a Syrian smuggler; traveled to Ramadi in Iraq with many other foreign fighters of varying nationalities and finally, that Ahmad intended to be a suicide bomber in Iraq, just not on the specific mission during which he was actually injured. The AP report has Ahmad leaving for Syria before the end of Ramadan; brought across to Iraq by “four Iraqi teenagers”; taken to Ramadi with just one other Saudi fighter; nine people dying in the attack and most importantly, that Ahmad never intended to be a suicide bomber in Iraq, just a jihadi fighter. I went over all of these facts and many others in detail with Ahmad and several Saudi Ministry of Interior officials who were familiar with the facts of Ahmad’s case, as well as with the Saudi psychologist who treated Ahmad. Ahmad and my sources, along with both the CNN interview and the AP report, confirm that Ahmad never went to Iraq intending to be a suicide bomber, as is reported in USA TODAY. The fact that Ahmad was never told he was sent on a suicide mission was a common practice among Zarqawi’s fighters at that time. See Tom Downey, “The Insurgent’s Tale,” Rolling Stone, December 15, 2005. Ahmad, my sources and AP also confirm that Ahmad left Saudi Arabia during Ramadan 2004 and not after, as USA TODAY reports. And at odds with USA TODAY, AP and my interview and sources confirm that Ahmad traveled to Ramadi with just one Saudi fighter, not “many foreign fighters.” Lastly, AP’s report that Ahmad crossed into Iraq from Syria with the help of “four Iraqi teenagers” is not confirmed by Ahmad and my sources, or the USA TODAY piece, all of which has Ahmad crossing the Syrian-Iraqi
border with the assistance of a Syrian smuggler by the alias of “Abu Mohammed,” which makes more sense than “four Iraqi teenagers” leading the would-be fighters across the Syrian and Iraqi borders. Other accounts of how fighters were transported from Syria into Iraq during 2004 and early 2005 reference Syrian smugglers as responsible for the border crossings. See Abdul-Ahad Ghaith, “A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria’s Influential, Changing Role,” Washington Post, June 8, 2005.

Chapter Two

Interviews of Abby, his colleagues, and his counseling Saudi psychologist occurred over the summer of 2008, and the winter, spring and summer of 2009 in Saudi Arabia, and additional follow in 2009, 2010 and 2011.

For the Holy Qur’an on honey see (16:69). The best of numerous translations of the Qur’an consulted include:

2. Majid Fakhry, trans., The Qur’an, Reading, UK: Garnet, 2005
3. Laleh Bakhtiar, trans., The Sublime Quran, Chicago: Kazi, 2009
7. Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, trans., The Glorious Qur’an, New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 2006;


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Abby’s favorite ayah (or verse) in the Holy Qur’an is ayah 56 in Surah Ya-Sin.


As with Ahmad in Chapter One, the story of Abby and his girlfriend Maryam are additional portraits of a jihadi as a young man (and in this case, woman). The motives behind any individual jihadi are as complex, hidden and varied as the diverse human beings who are attracted to radicalism. In fact, discerning true human motivations is a perilous and often tenuous task in any sphere. Yet with jihadis, it is a mission that we must embark on, or be doomed to failure in our response. There are numerous reasons—known or unconscious— that motivate jihadis to act. The first point is often overlooked. Even the best among the limited empirical research available focuses on the conscious motivations that jihadis overtly express, or those apparent factors that can be discerned from their outward circumstances. As this chapter (and indeed this entire book) makes clear, however, the psychological, unconscious propellers of human action are every bit as important to determining who may become radicalized. For example, Marc Sageman, who has conducted perhaps the most extensive studies (see both his excellent Terror Networks and his even better Leaderless Jihad), rightly concludes that jihadis are “generally idealistic young people [and] essentially romantic men and women chasing a dream.” (Leaderless Jihad, pp. 33-35). However, that “dream” can only be understood in its own very particular cultural context. The idealistic and romantic nature of Abby and Maryam is very much rooted to a specific and discrete Saudi Muslim culture. By way of comparison to Afghan culture in this regard, see Jack Healy, “In Afghanistan, Rage at Young Lovers,” The New York Times, July 30, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/world/asia/31herat.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed on July 31, 2011) Without understanding that culture, more generic
academic studies of the causes of radicalization fall wide of the mark. Of course, since that culture varies from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, general conclusions involving other young jihadists should only be drawn with caution. Indeed, this book shows the importance of culture to understanding individual radicalization, and presents the case for a broader cultural and religious understanding behind particular actors.


There are more than 1.5 million women domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, with about half from Indonesia. The Saudi Labor Law excludes all domestic workers from any protections, and their abuse inside the Kingdom is endemic. See Faiza Saleh Ambah, “A Critical View of Saudis’ Treatment of Foreign Help,” Washington Post, December 7, 2008 and Human Rights Watch, “As If I Am Not Human: Abuses
against Asian Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia,” July 2008 (accessed on February 21, 2009 at:

The role of the Internet and chat rooms in particular to Jihadi radicalization is examined in Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad at 112-16. (“Major developments...are expanding the role of women in the movement...They are more active in chat rooms....sharing their hopes and dreams with their virtual friends on these radical forums.”). See also Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment,” Cultures & Conflicts, June 12, 2008 (“The Internet has no doubt played a major role in the self-radicalization of many young Saudis. The Internet has also facilitated communications between interested recruits and so-called gatekeepers who can give practical advice on how to get to Iraq. Written instructions on how to join the Iraq jihad have also circulated online.”) The increasing role of women in the Iraqi jihad has been reported by Sudarsan Raghavan, “Female Suicide Bombers are Latest War Tactic,” Washington Post, September 17, 2008 and Tom A. Peter, “Daughters of Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 2008.

Chapter Three

Interviews of Malik and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008 in Pakistan, with follow up throughout 2009, 2010 and 2011.

As Nicholas Kristof, the outstanding New York Times columnist wrote: “Barack Obama’s most difficult international test...will very likely be here in Pakistan. A country with 170 million people and up to 60 nuclear weapons may be


For background information on the Taliban, its ideology, behavior, and comparison with al-Qaeda, before, during, and after the death of Osama Bin Laden, see:

1. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, supra.
2. Rashid, Taliban, and Descent into Chaos, supra.

“Pakistan is the only nuclear state with a powerful militant insurgency in its midst, one that clearly has aims to take over the country, and desperately wants to acquire the Bomb. It does not help matters that the government has veered between a dictatorship that has supported both the United States and the Taliban and a newly elected democratic leadership known chiefly for corruption and ineptitude.” David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, New York: Harmony Books, 2009 at 176-77; See also the Washington Post's insightful David Ignatius: “Of all the problems confronting the Obama administration, none is trickier than Pakistan – a nuclear power that has a war in Afghanistan on its western border, a tense confrontation with India on its eastern border and deadly insurgency at home from Muslim militants who want to topple the pro-American government.” David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Problem,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2009; Bruce Riedel, former CIA veteran, senior White House adviser on Middle East and South Asian issues and chair of President Obama’s strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan: “Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today, where every nightmare of the twenty-century—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the danger of nuclear war, dictatorship, poverty, and drugs—come together in one place.” Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, at 13.
For background on Terror Free Tomorrow’s extensive work in Pakistan, see http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5. The Daily Times article on the importance of our polling can be accessed in full at: http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/March%2017%20Daily%20Times.pdf

According to the Washington Post, the American official who monitors Pakistan most closely over the past six years has been Admiral Mike Mullen, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “I’ve tried ...really hard to understand Pakistan over the last year-plus, and it’s much more opaque than it is transparent,” Mullen explained. See David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Problem,” Washington Post, January 30, 2009.

My interviews with the senior American intelligence official, who spoke on background, occurred primarily over March and April 2009, with additional subsequent follow-up throughout 2010 and 2011.

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For the role of JUI and the madrassas in the UN refugee camps, see Rashid, Taliban, and Descent into Chaos. For the importance of these camps in the formation and support of the Taliban movement, see Daniel Del Castillo, “Pakistan’s Islamic Colleges Provide the Taliban’s Spiritual Fire,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 28, 2001. See also “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of
Words?" Asia Report No. 158—24 July 2008, International Crisis Group, at 3: “With the Pakistani military’s patronage and foreign funding, extremist madrasas in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt of Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) also mushroomed, becoming a source of recruitment and influence for the Afghan Mujahidin. As millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, refugee camps likewise became a source of support and recruitment for the Afghan Islamists....The distorted interpretations of Sunni Deobandism taught in these madrasas, superimposed on an equally distorted version of Pashtunwali were to form the Taliban creed. The Taliban foot soldiers (the talibs, students, from which the movement took its name) were mainly dispossessed, marginalized Pashtun youth, many from the Pakistani madrasas.”


For the known (and quite limited) biographical background on Mullah Omar, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars at 288-89 and 549. (“He [Mullah Omar] believed in the prophecy of dreams and spoke about them in political and military meetings, drawing on them to explain important decisions.”). For more on the mystical inclinations and the central role of dreams for Mullah Omar, see Bergen The Osama Bin Laden I Know at 162-63; 315; 326; Robert Fisk, “Visions that Come to Men as They Sleep,” The Independent, January 26, 2008; Iain Edgar, at 68-69; Robert Marquand, “The Reclusive Ruler who Runs the Taliban,” The Christian Science


“Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan was an influential member of the Taliban Inner Shura.” See Ismail Khan, “Omar Called Washington to Seek Evidence against Osama,” Dawn, September 15, 2004. Mullah Ehsanullah was one of the most important Taliban leaders, before he was killed, to have contact with American officials. See Unclassified State Department cables (released by the National Security Archives). See also Rashid, Taliban, at 100-101.


Al Qaeda’s camp in Jalalabad around the year 2000 is described in Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* at 167-68, and at 164 (Pashtun tribal code of honor). Al-Misri served as “general commander of all [Al Qaeda]’s camps.” Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know* at 277. See also Mark Kukis, salon.com.

On the Taliban internal debate after 9/11 on whether to hand over bin Laden, see Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* at 163-66 and Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 249.

The re-grouping of the Taliban and reconstituting of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan from 2002 and subsequently is authoritatively described by Ahmad Rashid in *Descent into Chaos* at 242-246: “In the winter of 2002, Mullah Omar arrived in Quetta from Afghanistan. He was immediately accommodated by the ISI and stayed in safe houses run by the JUI Party, which now formed the provincial government in Quetta. Mullah Omar appointed four senior commanders to reorganize the fighters in the southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul. These were Mullah Barader Akhund, the former deputy defense minister; Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Usmani, former army chief; Mullah Dadullah, a famed one-legged corps commander; and the former interior minister Mullah Abdul Razzaq. All four men had close links to bin Laden and were known for their belief in global jihad....These exiled Taliban leaders received important support after the 2002 elections when the JUI Party came to power in the North-West Frontier and Balochistan provinces. The
JUI had helped launch the Taliban in 1994, and its madrassas in Pakistan had provided ideological training and refuge for scores of Taliban commanders. Several JUI mullahs who had fought with the Taliban in the 1990s were now elected members of the provincial assemblies in the two provinces..... Maulana Nur Mohammed, who ran the important Shaldara madrassa in Quetta, the first madrassa to send its students to fight for the Taliban in 1994, made it the major meeting place for Taliban commanders.” See also Staff Report, “Mullah Omar Gives Interview,” BBC News, May 17, 2002; and Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 325. The UN Consolidated List is an authoritative resource. United Nations, *The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them*, Version last updated on 03 October 2008.

Indeed, according to American military and intelligence officials: “From Quetta, Taliban leaders including Mullah Muhammad Omar, a reclusive, one-eyed cleric, guide the commanders in southern Afghanistan, raise money from wealthy Persian Gulf donors and deliver guns and fresh fighters to the battlefield, according to Obama administration and military officials....American intelligence officials said that the dozen or so militants who were thought to make up the Taliban leadership were believed to be hiding either in the sprawling Afghan refugee camps near Quetta or in some of the city’s Afghan neighborhoods.” Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears,” *New York Times*, February 10, 2009.

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the structure the Kandahar Taliban formed the “Quetta Shura”—a body consisting of the old-guard senior leadership, which had relocated to Quetta/Peshawar, tasked to closely direct strategy on the ground, facilitate the transfer of funds, recruit individuals to join their ranks, and implement propaganda campaigns. See Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan – Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar”, Counter Terrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, November 2010. Mullah Usmani was for a time from 2002 onwards considered to be Mullah Omar’s second-in-command and potential successor, before he was killed by American forces in Helmand Province in December 2006. See Stephen Grey, “Key Taliban Leaders in Afghanistan Eliminated, ABC News, July 24, 2008; Staff Report, “Top Taliban Leader Killed in U.S. Air Strike,” The Hindu, December 24, 2006; Staff Report, “Taliban Admit Commander’s Death,” BBC News, December 27, 2006; Jason Straziuso, “Killing of Taliban Leader Major Victory,” Associated Press, May 13, 2007.

The importance of dreams to political decision making by Mullah Omar was set forth above. Rahimullah Yusufzai, the Pashtun journalist and BBC correspondent, was one of the very few reporters to have ever interviewed Mullah Omar. According to Yusufzai: “No big military operation can happen unless he [Mullah Omar] gets his instructions in dreams; he was a big believer in dreams.” (Quoted in Iain Edgar, at 68.)

From 2002 through 2009 and thereafter, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, served as the headquarters for Mullah Omar and Taliban leaders to finance, organize and direct the Afghan insurgency, both in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. See Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in
For the overall views of ordinary Taliban fighters in late 2007 (and the only attempt to create more structured and representative survey), see Staff Report, “Talking to the Taliban,” The Globe and Mail, March 22-28, 2008.

An essential element to the renewed Taliban insurgency was the heroin trade. As one American officer summed up the traffic to the New York Times: “Drugs out [from Afghanistan] and guns in [from Pakistan].


Weapons, supplies, heroin and insurgents have freely crossed the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan from 2002 through 2008 and thereafter, with the direct collusion and assistance of the Pakistani Army and ISI, particularly at the border crossing into Southern Afghanistan at Chaman. See Declan Walsh, “Across the Border from Britain’s Troops, Taliban Rises Again,” The Guardian, May 27, 2006; Carlotta Gall, “At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge,” New York Times, January 21, 2007. In fact, General John Nicholson, the deputy commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan told the New York Times that between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “The borders are open.” Dexter Filkins of the Times reported:
“American commanders say the open borders allow the opium to move unimpeded into Pakistan and for the weapons and other supplies to flow in [to Afghanistan].”


http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5043&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1

According to Ahmed Rashid, American interceptions of wireless communications between Taliban commanders and Pakistan army officers at the border revealed that, “the Taliban would speak to officers at border checkpoints, asking for safe passage.” See Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 222-224. The cooperation between the ISI, Pakistani Army and the Taliban even grew so open that a Pakistani Army official even publicly declared some of the militant leaders as “patriots.” See Hamid Mir, “Army Official Calls Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah ‘Patriots’” *The News*, December 1, 2008.


Mullah Dadullah was killed by NATO forces in Afghanistan in early May 2007. Staff Report, “Afghan Taleban Commander Killed,” *BBC News*, May 13, 2007; Staff Report, “NATO: Taliban Mastermind Killed in Afghanistan,” *CNN*, May 13,

**Chapter Four**

Interviews of Zeddy (Shaheed’s camp commander) and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008 in Pakistan, with follow up throughout 2009, 2010 and 2011.

The best recent reporting on the involvement of the Pakistani Army and its intelligence agency in supporting the Taliban and other Islamist radicals has come from outstanding work by the *New York Times* and by Dexter Filkins at *The New Yorker*. See *e.g.*:


4. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Tied to 2007 Border Ambush on Americans,”
The New York Times, September 26, 2011,

See also:

On May 1, 2011, President Barak Obama announced that Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks on the United States, was killed in a firefight by U.S. forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. See Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says”, New York Times, May 1, 2011 and at nytimes.com http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-
The death of Bin Laden marked what Obama referred to as the “most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al Qaeda.” Id. President Obama, however, went on to state that the death of Bin Laden “does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that Al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us.” For more information regarding the raid and killing of Osama Bin Laden, including the U.S., Pakistani, and global reaction, see:


6. Graeme Smith, “Pakistan’s reaction to Osama’s Killing shows it’s a country of contradictions”, *Globe and Mail*, May 14, 2011, and at


   http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/the_code_of_the_hills?page=0,1

9. Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan’s top military officials are worried about militant collaborators in their ranks”, *The Washington Post*, May 27, 2011, and at


The widespread campus violence and “Kalashnikov culture” of the student wing of Jamaat Islami during the late 1970’s and 1980’s is examined in Vali Nasr, at 68-70. See also Gilles Kepel, *Jihad The Trial of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003 at 104-105 and *Partisans of Allah* (“Armed with Mawdudi’s dictums in simple Urdu and the zeal of its student wing, the Jamiat-i-
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Tulaba, the Jamaat has made a mark on the moral economy of Pakistani society in the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province...” (p.264)). As Steve Coll also wrote in Ghost Wars: “Jamaat would become a vanguard of Pakistan’s official and clandestine Islamist agendas in Afghanistan and later Kashmir.” (pp.26-27). For general background, see www.jamiat.org.pk. See also Partisans of Allah at 273: “Although the maulana [Maududi]’s followers claimed to promote nonsectarian views, the insistence on capital punishment for apostasy was an implicit declaration of jihad against Muslims who refused to embrace the Jamaat-i-Islami’s ideology.”

For the rise of the Jamaat in Pakistan with the Afghan jihad, see Kepel at 100-105. See also Partisans of Allah at 274: “Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Jamaat-i-Islami found the opportunity to make a decisive breakthrough in Pakistani politics. By throwing its weight behind the Afghan resistance movement, the organization catapulted itself onto center stage in the American-backed jihad orchestrated with the help of the Pakistani army and its intelligence services.”


Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “A $4 Million Ransom?” Newsweek, February 6, 2008: “Five months after the release of the 21 surviving South Korean hostages who had been captured by the Taliban in July, Afghan insurgents are claiming that Seoul paid a hefty ransom for the Christian missionaries’ freedom. In an interview in this week’s edition of Afaq, a Pashtu-language magazine published in neighboring Pakistan, senior Taliban leader Ustad Yasir confirmed that a large ransom indeed had been paid. “If we were going to free them without any payment, [the hostage taking] would not have been worth it,” he said. “The best way to release them was with a ransom payment.” Two hostages were executed before the others were released. Another senior Taliban commander, who would only speak on condition of anonymity for security purposes, tells NEWSWEEK that the South Korean government paid at least $4 million for the missionaries’ release and that it delivered the cash to the insurgents in the Pakistani frontier city of Quetta.”

On the role of the Emir (or Amir), Vali Nasr, The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, writes: “The amir is the supreme source of authority in the Jamaat and can demand the unwavering obedience of all members.” (p. 53).

For the JI’s infiltration of the ISI and the Army, see Philip Jenkins, “Clerical Terror,” The New Republic, December 24, 2008: “Jamaatis [members of Jamaat Islami] infiltrated Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishments, which, by the
1970s, were rife with hard-line Islamist views. These agencies, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), became the main conduit for Saudi money and influence, a link that became all the stronger during the Afghan war. In Kashmir, too, JI cooperated closely with ISI and sponsored its own mujahedin militia.” See also Partisans of Allah at 264: “At the ideological level, the Jamaat-i-Islami has remained committed to Mawdudi’s ideal of precipitating an intellectual revolution through education and the systematic infiltration of key state institutions like the army.”

On A.Q. Khan, see David E. Sanger, The Inheritance, at 181: “Khan was once at the center of almost every major nuclear flash-point the United States faces today. It was Khan who sold Iran the uranium enrichment equipment and designs that put it within reach of a bomb and on a collision course with the West. It was Khan who sold the North Korean those centrifuges, which they thought they needed to explore a new path to making weapons, after their first efforts – producing plutonium from an aging nuclear reactor – were shut down by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s. And it was Khan who not only delivered the Libyans more than $100 million worth in centrifuges but threw in a bonus, wrapped inside the plastic bags from the dry cleaner near his house: the nearly complete blueprints for the bomb China set off in the mid-1960s.” See also Salman Masood and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Frees Nuclear Dealer in Snub to U.S,” New York Times, February 7, 2009 and Joby Warrick, “Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan is Freed from House Arrest,” Washington Post, February 7. 2009.

On General Hameed Gul and his role, see Ahmad Rashid, Taliban at 128–29. The United States has requested that the United Nations place Hameed Gul, former General in charge of the ISI, on the list of international terrorists. See Staff Report,

American intelligence officials believe that the ISI has significantly assisted the Taliban and other Jihadi militants since 9/11. See Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008 (CIA has evidence that ISI has “deepened their ties with some militant groups that were responsible for the surge of violence in Afghanistan”); Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1, 2008 (American intercepted communications between ISI and terrorists who attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul show that ISI “helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing... The ISI officers had not been renegades,” and their actions were authorized by superiors); David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007; Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” New York Times, December 8, 2008 (ISI aided terrorist group responsible for attacks in Mumbai, India); and David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Puzzle,” Washington Post, January 30, 2009 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen quoted as stating that the leaders of Pakistan’s Army now “recognize that they’ve got to get out of where they’ve been, which is in support of these militants.”). See also Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, at 221 (“To maintain its
influence among the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, the ISI developed a two-track policy of protecting the Taliban while handling over al Qaeda Arabs and other non-Afghans to the United States.”); Bruce Riedel, at 86 (“The Taliban apparatus in Pakistan’s madrassas was not dismantled, and many Taliban officials continued to operate in Pakistani cities, particularly Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. By 2004 they were openly fundraising in Quetta again. No major Taliban official has ever been arrested in Pakistan.”); Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival, 49:1, Spring 2007, at 18: (“There is virtual unanimity among United States, NATO, UN and Afghan officials that Pakistani assistance [to the Taliban] is significant. The ISI has reportedly provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban fighters. The ISI has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar and other areas in Pakistan.”); Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007: (“Intelligence collected during Western military offensives... confirmed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support the Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province, in western Pakistan.”); David E. Sanger, at 144; Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007 and Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” The Washington Quarterly, 31:2, Spring 2008, at 7-32. See also “Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, September 22, 2011 (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-
General Ahmad Shujaa Pasha, the head of the ISI, explaining why he is unwilling to apprehend the Taliban leadership, who are reportedly in Quetta, said: “They [the Taliban leaders] believe jihad is their obligation. Isn’t that freedom of opinion?” Susanne Koelbl, “Interview: Pakistan’s New Intelligence Chief,” *Der Spiegel*, January 6, 2009. See also Helene Cooper, “Dreaming of Splitting the Taliban,” *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.


According to the *New York Times*, a senior Pakistani government admitted: “It’s a game. The U.S. is being taken for a ride.” The ISI protects the Taliban, hands over a few Al Qaeda operatives, and the US funnels aid to the ISI and Army to go after the Taliban and Al Qaeda. “The reason the Pakistani security services support the Taliban is for money: after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani military concluded that keeping the Taliban alive was the surest way to win billions in aid that Pakistan needed to survive. The military’s complicated relationship with the Taliban is part of what one official called the Pakistani military’s ‘strategic games.’” See Dexter Filkins, “Right At the Edge,” *New York Times*, September 7, 2008. See also David E. Sanger at 144 and 245-46: “In return for the American billions, Pakistani forces or intelligence operatives occasionally picked off a few al Qaeda leaders (though even that had slowed to a trickle). But they were actively supporting the Taliban and even
some of the militants in the tribal regions. In a world of fungible money—that $10 billion in American aid was paid straight to the Pakistani treasury—it was almost as if the American taxpayers were making monthly deposits in the Taliban’s bank accounts.”

JI leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad repeatedly met with Osama bin Laden, and even hosted him at Jamaat headquarters. On January 28, 2003, Khalid Sheik Muhammad was arrested in Rawalpindi from the house of a JI member. The JI leader also personally received funds from the ISI. See “Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Osama bin Laden,” Daily Times, March 20, 2006. The house of the JI member was located in a secure military housing estate in Rawalpindi. See also Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, at 227; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, at 226: “The Jamiat connection to al Qaeda proved deeply contentious. The Jamiat is Pakistan’s most ideological Islamic party, with close links to the army and the ISI. On behalf of the ISI it had spawned numerous extremists group to fight in Kashmir and had twice helped the military undermine the government of Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s. Opposition politicians alleged militants had been arrested from Jamiat members’ homes in Karachi and Lahore, while the Jamiat leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, denied that al Qaeda even existed.”

Bin Laden’s initial connections when he arrived in Pakistan to help the Afghan jihad were through the Jamaat Islami. See Steve Coll The Bin Ladens, at 250-51. During 1985 and 1986, Bin Laden was in Peshawar, Pakistan, in contact with JI and other local Islamists, before he set up his first camp in Afghanistan in 1986. See Peter Bergen The Osama Bin Laden I Know, at 46-47; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, at 156-58; Wright, The Looming Tower, at 128; Bergen, Holy War, at 59; Coll, The Bin
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*Ladens* at 290-91. In his interview, Zeddy places the date of his meeting of Bin Laden to help him find a location to set up a camp in 1985. While some sources place Bin Laden’s first camp at Jaji as being established in 1985 (*See* Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*, at 46-47), all the others listed above place it at some time during 1986.

Bin Laden’s education and background are described in Coll, *The Bin Ladens*, at 137-52.

Bin Laden’s worldview during the mid-1980’s is examined in Wright, *The Looming Tower* at 172; Bergen, *Holy War* at 54 and 67; and Coll, *Ghost Wars* at 163.

For the ISI’s relationship to Jamaat and the ISI’s role in arming the Afghan resistance, *see* Rashid, *Taliban* at 130 quoting Olivier Roy: “The organization, arming and financing of the Afghan Mujahideen was ‘a joint venture between Saudi [intelligence], the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI.’” The “lucrative management” of the flow of arms to the Afghan Mujahideen and its benefits to JI’s finances is referenced in Vali Nasr at 61.


The corruption of the Jamaat and Jihadi groups generally in Pakistan is also noted in Jessica Stern, *In the Name of God* at 136-37; 213-16.
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“The Al-Badr is the first Jihadi organization to have introduced suicide attacks into the sub-continent. Al-Badr has its headquarters in the Mansehra district of the North-West Frontier Province, with Pashtuns making up the largest part of al-Badr. Al-Badr was an active participant in the Indo-Pakistani Kargil war of 1999.” Mukhtar Khan “Kashmir’s Al-Badr Mujahideen Hard Hit by Indian Offensive,” Terrorism Focus (Jamestown Foundation), January 21, 2009. For more on Al-Badr, see the South Asia Terrorism Portal report on Al Badr (www.sato.org) (“The Al Badr is reported to have close linkages with the Inter-Services Intelligence and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.”) and Staff Report, “Who are the Kashmiri Militants?” BBC News, June 4, 2006.

On the Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India in 1999, see Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Policy Paper Series, 2002:
“Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting.” Yet as one former Pakistani Army chief acknowledged, “In ten years of insurgency, we never allowed our [Pakistani] troops to operate with the militants but now that taboo has been broken.” Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 412 note 35. As Pakistan faced retaliation from Indian forces, “there was disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment.” Alan Sipress and Thomas Ricks, “India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in 1999,” *Washington Post*, May 15, 2002. With Pakistan forced to withdraw under heavy American pressure (See Riedel), “Pakistan lost on all counts.” (Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 42.) But years later, General Musharraf was still claiming that the Jihadis had achieved a great success: “Kargil was a military success...diplomatically it highlighted Kashmir....That was something the Jihadis achieved,” according to Musharraf. Isabel Hilton, “The General in His Labyrinth,” *The New Yorker*, August 12, 2002. For an analysis of the Kargil conflict, see also *Descent into Chaos*, at 41-42 and notes 35-40 at page 412; Coll, *Ghost Wars* at 476; Bruce Riedel, *Id.*; A.R. Siddiqi, “Musharraf’s Kargil Demarche: Kargil Reversed,” *Dawn*, December 31, 2003; Peter Popham, “Armies Begin to Withdraw in Kashmir,” *The Independent*, July 13, 1999; Muddassir Rizvi, “Sharif Faces a New Front at Home,” *Asia Times*, July 8, 1999 and July 15, 1999; and B. Raman, “Kargil: Post-Mortem,” South Asia Analysis Group Paper, August 2, 1999.

According to David Sanger of the *New York Times*, in early 2008, “Al Qaeda and other militant groups were focusing anew on the Holy Grail that eluded them before 9/11: stealing the secrets to the Pakistani bomb.” (*The Inheritance*, p. 178) Sanger cites an American intelligence report that Al Qaeda was renewing its efforts
to obtain access to nuclear weapons, including recruiting scientists with radical
Islamist sympathies to “seek jobs within [Pakistan’s] nuclear infrastructure.” Sanger,
The Inheritance, at 178. Indeed, Al Qaeda had made numerous past efforts to obtain
access to nuclear weapons, including a meeting between Osama bin Laden and
Pakistan Nightmare for Obama,” New York Times, January 11, 2009. See also Steven
Erlanger, “Lax Nuclear Security in Russia is Cited as Way for bin Laden to Get
Arms,” New York Times, November 12, 2001; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, at
120-21.

Chapter Five
Interviews of Shaheed and his colleagues occurred over the summer and fall of 2008
in Pakistan, with follow up from 2009 through 2011.

For a physical description of bin Laden, see Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens and
Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know and Holy War, Inc. at 18.

On the meaningless of the border—the so-called Durand Line—between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, see David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: “While Americans
rightly regard Pakistan and Afghanistan as separate countries, to the Taliban and
other Pashtun tribal leaders, it is all one friendly, familiar piece of territory. To them,
the border, formally known as the Durand Line, is just a Western invention, an
invisible boundary named for a long-dead Brit. It is meaningless to them; it only
means something to the American military and NATO, for whom it has long been a
wall over which they could not pass.” (p.241). On Pakistan’s trucks, see James
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The entire 72nd chapter or Surah of the Holy Qur’an is devoted to the jinn, and there are numerous other references throughout the Qur’an. For the significance of jinn in Islamic belief and practice, see Mustafa Ashour, The Jinn in the Qur’an and the Sunna, London: Dar Al-Taqwa, 2000 and Umar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, The World of Jinn and Devils, Boulder: Al Basheer, 1998. The Baithak sessions are described in Mumtaz Nasir, “Baithak: Exorcism in Peshawar (Pakistan),” Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 46, 1987, pp. 159-78.


Sexual violence against women in Pakistan and students in elementary and secondary schools, as well as university, is also pandemic. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “sexual harassment at all levels has spiraled out of control.” Annual Report, State of Human Rights in 2007, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad at pp. 145-61. The Human Rights Commission Annual Report also cites a report by the Pakistan Pediatric Association, which found that 15 percent of all children in Pakistan had suffered at least one incident of sexual abuse. Id. at page 166. In 2010, the Human Rights Commission Annual Report indicated that roughly 800 women were victims of “honor killings” – murders committed to preserve the honor of the victims’ family members—and 2,900 women were victims of rape. Annual Report, State of Human Rights in 2010, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, and available at http://www.hrcp-web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf. See also Staff Report, “Rape, Mutilation: Pakistan’s Tribal Justice for Women,” Dawn, August 9, 2011.

California Press, 1994: “The IJT [Jamaat’s student organization] uses strong-arm tactics to resolve the academic problems of its members or associates, provides university housing to them, and in some cases gains admission for them to the university.” (p. 70.)

The case of Shaheed and his colleagues is an excellent real-life illustration of the importance of social networks theorized by Marc Sageman, particularly the intense group dynamics as completely transforming the participants “in a process of in-group love.” See Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* and Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. Sageman specifically identifies “radical Muslim student associations” as a critical network to mobilize young Muslims (*Leaderless Jihad* at 85).


The importance of dreams to bin Laden generally and around the 9/11 attacks specifically is described in Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower* at 402-03. The significance of dreams generally in jihadi culture is analyzed by Robert Fisk, “Visions that Come to Men as They Sleep,” *The Independent*, January 26, 2008 and Iain Edgar, “The Inspirational Night Dream in the Motivation and Justification of Jihad,”
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Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions (University of California Press), Volume 11, Issue 2, 2007 at 59-76: “Islam is probably the largest night dream culture in the world today... The experience of the true dream (ruya) is a fundamental, inspirational, and even strategic, part of the contemporary militant jihadist movement.”

The support of the ISI for the Taliban after their defeat in 2001 is examined at length in Chapters Three and Four, and accompanying notes supra. Specifically, American intelligence officials believe that the ISI has significantly assisted the Taliban and other Jihadi militants since 9/11. See Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008 (CIA has evidence that ISI has “deepened their ties with some militant groups that were responsible for the surge of violence in Afghanistan”); Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1, 2008 (American intercepted communications between ISI and terrorists who attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul show that ISI “helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing... The ISI officers had not been renegades,” and their actions were authorized by superiors); David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007; Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” New York Times, December 8, 2008 (ISI aided terrorist group responsible for attacks in Mumbai, India); and David Ignatius, “The Pakistan Puzzle,” Washington Post, January 30, 2009 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen quoted as stating that the leaders of Pakistan’s Army now “recognize that they’ve got to get out of where they’ve been, which is in support of these militants.”). See also
Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, at 221 (“To maintain its influence among the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, the ISI developed a two-track policy of protecting the Taliban while handling over al Qaeda Arabs and other non-Afghans to the United States.”); Bruce Riedel at 86 (“The Taliban apparatus in Pakistan’s madrassas was not dismantled, and many Taliban officials continued to operate in Pakistani cities, particularly Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. By 2004 they were openly fundraising in Quetta again. No major Taliban official has ever been arrested in Pakistan.”); Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” *Survival*, 49:1, Spring 2007, at 18: (“There is virtual unanimity among United States, NATO, UN and Afghan officials that Pakistani assistance [to the Taliban] is significant. The ISI has reportedly provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, and paid the medical bills of some wounded Taliban fighters. The ISI has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar and other areas in Pakistan.”); Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2007: (“Intelligence collected during Western military offensives... confirmed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support the Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province, in western Pakistan.”).

On the growing unrest in Pakistan during 2008 and the increasing radicalization of the youth, see Moeed Yusuf at 4-5. See also Peter Bergen and Ken Ballen, *The National*, July 5, 2008, which can be accessed at: http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakJunSept.pdf (accessed February 20, 2009); Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, “Taliban Threaten to Kill
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Dua, or supplication to Allah, is an Islamic practice of expression that is used to call out to Allah for help or guidance. Dua is mentioned throughout the Qur’an and Hadith. For more information, please refer to the following, including, but not limited to: Surah Al-Furqan, 25:77, Surah Al-Mumin 40:60, Surah Al-Baqarah, 2:186.

The desire of the Jihadi militants to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is examined as well in Chapter Four, supra. As Bruce Riedel, former senior advisor on Middle East and South Asian affairs in the White House wrote: “The growing presence of al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan should serve as a cause for deep concern. The greatest possible threat is that al Qaeda will recruit a senior Pakistani military officer in control of some part of the national arsenal, who may then secretly pass one or two weapons to the terrorists and use his senior position to cover up the theft.” Bruce Riedel at 133. See also Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know, Chapter 11, “Al Qaeda’s Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” at 337-49.
Shaheed’s quotes from the Qur’an are from Surah Al-Maidah (The Table) 5:32 and 5:48, and from Surah Yasin, 36:65. Two Jews visiting the Prophet is cited in Hadith (words, actions, inactions of the Prophet Muhammad that are not considered the word of Allah, but, rather, secondary text used to understand the Qur’an, Islamic jurisprudence, and the Islamic way of living life). Sunan Tirmidhi, Book of Exegesis, Bani Israel, Hadith # 3069.

The Tablighi Jamaat is best known in the United States as the organization through which John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban, became radicalized before being trained by Al Qaeda and fighting with the Taliban. See Evan Thomas, “A Long Strange Trip to the Taliban,” Newsweek, December 17, 2001. Other Americans have also been alleged to initially been radicalized through the Tablighi Jamaat as well, including Jose Padilla, the American Al Qaeda recruit held for allegedly planning to set off a “dirty” radiological bomb, and Richard Reid, the British Al Qaeda member and so-called “shoe bomber.” Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003. For background on the Tablighi Jamaat, see Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008 at 267-68 and at 280-81 (“An estimated two million people typically converge at the Tablighi Jamaat’s annual meeting in Lahore, of which 90 percent are said to be Pathans [Pashtuns] from Peshawar and the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.”). In fact, the Tablighi Jamaat is now “the largest preaching mission of any religion in the world,” and their annual meeting has been estimated to attract the largest concentration of Muslims after the hajj. See I.H. Raashed, “Rejecting Publicity, Yet Drawing Millions,” Dawn, October 24, 2002 and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival, Vol. 49 no. 1 Spring 2007, at
There are two views of Tablighi Jamaat. The first is that according to the FBI and American intelligence officials, Tabligh members are “ideal recruits” for Al Qaeda and that Al Qaeda has repeatedly “used them for recruiting.” See Lisa Myers, “FBI Monitors Islamic Group for Terror Ties,” NBC News, January 18, 2005 and Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny,” New York Times, July 14, 2003. See also Alex Alexiev, “Tabligi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005. The other view is that they are a peaceful movement designed to return Muslims to Islam and convert non-Muslims through “heart-to-heart” communication. See I.H. Raashed, Id. and Barbara D. Metcalf, “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council: After 9/11, New York, 2004 (“No word resonates more in Tablighi reports of their experiences than shukun, the “peace” they experience as a foretaste of the paradise they believe their efforts (jihad) in this path of Allah help merit.”). A third point of view is presented by Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic Law at UCLA and former teenage member of the Tablighi: “I don’t believe there’s a sinister plot where they’re in bed with Osama bin Laden but are hiding it. But I think that the militants exploit the alienated and withdrawn social attitude created by the Tablighis by fishing in the Tablighi pond.” Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny,” New York Times, July 14, 2003; Nicholas Howenstei, “Islamist Networks: The Case of Tabligi Jamaat,” United States Institute of Peace Briefing, October 2006 and Maulana Aashiq Ilahi, Six Fundamentals, Lahore: Tablighi Jamaat (undated).

For news accounts of the Marriott terrorist attack and the claim of responsibility by the Fidayeen-e-Islam, see Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Islamabad’s

**Chapter Six**

Interviews of Kamal and his colleagues/relations occurred over the summer and fall of 2008, and throughout 2009, 2010, and 2011, in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Austria, the United States and elsewhere. Two Saudi Ministry of Interior officials independently confirmed to me the identity of Kamal as a member of the royal family (the Al al-Shaykh). Other inmates confirmed to me Kamal’s imprisonment.

“By the early twentieth century, the Al-Shaykhs had become Nejd’s most prestigious family of religious scholars.” Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens*, at 70 -71. See
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On the prevalence on so-called “summer marriages,” see Lulwa Shalhoub, “Children are the Main Victims of Summer Marriages,” Arab News, July 20, 2007.


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For an article on Bilal ibn Rabah, Islam's first muezzin, chosen by the Prophet Muhammad, see Barry Hoberman, “The First Muezzin,” Saudi Aramco World, July/August 1983.

General information on King Saud University can be accessed at its website: http://www.ksu.edu.sa/Pages/default.aspx


“Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s rejection of special human insight into the interpretation of scripture is consistent with his broad worldview, in which every individual believer is capable of and responsible for encountering God directly, without the help of human intercessors. Rather than relying on human interpreters of the scriptures, whether for theological or legal issues, he taught that individuals needed to read the scriptures for themselves in order that they might know directly what God had said. His further emphasis on the need to contextualize Qur’anic passages and understand their content, rather than focusing strictly on the Qur’an’s memorized form and word order, reflects his approach to scripture in general. He applied the same methodology to the study and interpretation of Hadith (defined supra) and: “Faith as a matter of the heart” is based on a hadith that states, “Islam is on the exterior, and faith is in the heart.” When asked to explain the difference between Islam and faith, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab replied that speaking of Islam is what leads to faith in the heart. Because faith is a true reflection of what lies in the heart and mind of the believer, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab accorded faith a higher ranking than Islam as ritual perfection.” (Page 80.) See also Id. at 74-75; 132-33 and at p. 166.


The role of the Internet to Jihadi radicalization in Saudi Arabia is expertly examined by Christopher Boucek, “The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point, August 2008 (Boucek quotes Saudi Ministry of Interior officials that there are 4.7 million Internet users in Saudi Arabia in 2008, with access to “several thousand” extremist websites.) The role of the Internet and chat rooms in particular to Jihadi radicalization is also examined by Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* at 112-16. See also Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment,” *Cultures & Conflicts*, June 12, 2008 (“The Internet has no doubt played a major role in the self-radicalization of many young Saudis.”). For gay sites, see Nadya Labi, “The Kingdom in the Closet,” *The Atlantic*, May 2007. For Osama bin Laden’s reverential view of the pivotal importance of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh, see Translation by Al Jazeera, “Osama bin Laden Condemns Arab Leaders,” *Al Jazeera* (audiotape released by Osama bin Laden) , March 14, 2009.
For Saudi citizens funding of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups, see:

3. Editorial, “Follow the Money,” quoting State Department cable by Secretary of State Clinton (“Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.”), *New York Times*, December 8, 2010;
4. Tim Lister, “WikiLeaks cables assess terrorism funding in Saudi Arabia, Gulf states,” CNN, December 6, 2010; and

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s program to rehabilitate Jihadis and its “Care Center,” were reported on CNN January 23 and 24, 2009, in a news report by CNN Correspondent and an interview with Ken Ballen. See

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/CNN_FP_LAT.pdf

I spent close to one month at the Care Center in the summer of 2008 and the winter and spring of 2009, interviewing forty-three Jihadi inmates, as well as over a dozen Center and MOI staff and other officials. See also Katherine Zoepf, “Deprogramming Jihadists,” *New York Times*, November 9, 2008; Caryle Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash

I also interviewed Juma Al-Dossari over the course of three days in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during August 2008. I interviewed Ghanim Abdul-Rahman Al-Harbi in Riyadh in March 2009. For more information regarding al-Harbi’s detention and release from Gitmo, see Murad Batal al-Shishani, “From Yemen to Detroit: The Expanding Influence of AQAP’s Sa’id al-Shihri”, *Militant Leadership Monitor*, February 28, 2010, pp. 6, Volume 1, Issue 2; see also “Reed Smith Presents 2007 Sean Halpin awards to Doug Spalding and Bernie Casey; Pro Bono Institute President speaks at Reed Smith Pro Lunch”, *The Pro Bono Wire*, May 1, 2007

http://www.imakenews.com/probonoinstitute/e_article0000907025.cfm?x=b9swG Fq.b65vgQtD. In August 2008, March 2009 and in April 2009, I interviewed the psychiatrist who intensively treated Juma. For the FBI’s intent to prosecute Juma for recruiting the Lackawanna Six, see Dan Herbeck, “Area Terror Cell Numbered 8,
meeting between Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Juma) and Rosa Prince,


Upon his release from the Saudi Care Center, he re-enlisted into the ranks of al-Qaeda where he became deputy leader of Al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch. See Robert F. Worth, “2 Ex-Detainees in Qaeda Video”, *The New York Times*, January 25, 2009, and available at


For Al Qaeda operatives being trained to dissemble and claim torture, see Bret Stephens, “Media Narratives Feed Terrorist Fantasies,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2008, quoting from internal Al Qaeda documents on falsely claiming torture in confinement. For official U.S. government documents, including various Combatant Status Review Board proceedings and Detainee Statements for both Ghanim Abdul Rahman Al Harbi and Said Ali Al Shiri, see the comprehensive collection of such documents maintained by the New York Times in “The Guantanamo Docket,” which can be accessed at:


Kamal’s reference to Surah al-Maidah is from the Holy Qur’an, 5:49.